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1 INTRODUCTION
This research project concerns the role of members of governing boards of 
formerly public assets, where these assets are transferred to a private or 
quasi-public organisation. We ask two fundamental, broad questions about 
these governing bodies. 
 The first concerns the balance between the role and responsibilities of 
board members. Governing bodies adopt corporate governance 
models which, interpreted strictly, require allegiance to the organisation 
itself, rather than to other interest groups. In this research, we refer to 
this as ‘the neutral allegiance model’ of governance. Where the 
governing body includes consumers of the service provided by the 
organisation, who have an individual and community ‘stake’ in that 
organisation, and/or elected representatives, how is such a neutral role 
managed. In this research, we refer to this as ‘the constituency model’
of governance. Put simply, do these people regard themselves as 
consumers, representatives or strategists (or some combination of 
each)?
 The second question concerns the relationship between the knowledge 
brought to the governing table by board members. In particular, we 
looked at the relationship between knowledge and expertise, which we 
call ‘the construction of expertise’, and how the construction of 
expertise affects the interactions amongst board members.
In order to answer these questions, we use a case study approach and a 
qualitative methodology. Our case study concerns the governing board of a 
housing association (or, more properly, Registered Social Landlord, referred 
to in this paper as ‘RSL’), which was set up to take on the management of 
properties formerly managed by the public sector, by a local authority. This 
take-over process is usually referred to in the literature as a ‘large-scale 
voluntary transfer’ (or LSVT).
RSL boards of governors in LSVTs are generally made up from three different 
constituencies. One third of the board are occupiers; one third are councillors 
from the local authority; and one third are independents. This is the 
constituency model. These people are said to be responsible and accountable 
to the RSL and not to other organisations, persons or interests. They are not 
representatives other than of the RSL itself. This is the neutral allegiance 
model. This concept of neutral allegiance appears to have been first codified 
in the National Federation of Housing Associations’ (NFHA) Code of 
Governance (NFHA, 1995a) which came out of an inquiry set up in 1995 by 
the NFHA (the trade body of housing associations, now the National Housing 4
Federation, NHF) under the chairmanship of Sir David Hancock (NFHA, 
1995b). Paragraph 3.2 of the Code notes that
All Board members share responsibility for its decision. Each should act only in the 
interests of the association and not on behalf of any constituency or interest group.
Our work tests the practicability and desirability of this proposition in this 
specific context. Although the issues raised by the constituency and neutral 
allegiance models clearly interrelate, they are conceptually separate and are 
dealt with separately in this report.
Secondly, occupiers might be expected to bring their knowledge as occupiers 
to the board, but there is uncertainty as to what other knowledge they might 
bring. Councillors clearly bring knowledge of council business as well as 
political allegiances and, maybe, ideologies. Independents are generally 
recruited to provide particular skills such as business knowledge, legal and 
financial expertise. This diversity raises questions not only about their ability 
to divorce themselves from their extra-board lives, but also about the range of 
expertises at the Board’s disposal as well as how the construction of expertise 
might impact on the interactions between Board members at meetings. Our 
work considers these issues.
These questions are considered in this paper both at a general level through 
analysis of interviews with key national actors and policy literature, as well as 
through a combination of qualitative research techniques working with an 
LSVT RSL which we refer to throughout this paper as ‘Wandland Housing 
Association’ and Wandland Council.
Our work has been qualitative, given the framing of our research questions in 
this way. It is necessarily small-scale, partly because of the limits of time and 
money on the research team, but partly also because this approach was best 
suited to considering these research questions. Our case study has provided 
a rich dataset, which we have analysed extensively. We do not claim that our 
work is representative of the RSL sector as a whole – nor could we given its 
limited nature. However, it is likely that our investigation will contain many 
points of reference – both by comparison and contrast – with other similar 
organisations within and outside the housing sector. Whilst LSVT is unique to 
housing, and contains sector-specific issues, there may well be more general 
lessons to be learnt.
In the next chapter, we consider certain background issues of policy, setting 
out the importance of LSVT within current housing policy. In the following 
chapter, we outline our methodology, detailing our case study and setting the 
scene. In chapter 4, we look at background issues discussed with the key 
actors and raised during our qualitative research with Wandland . In particular, 
we ask how the board members themselves viewed the organisation. In 
chapter 5, we discuss how the board members were appointed, as this raises 
issues pertinent to the discussion of our research questions. In chapter 6, we 
discuss the constituency model and we follow that in chapter 7 with a 
discussion of the neutral allegiance model. In chapter 8, we consider how the 5
expertise of board members was constructed, and how expertise was utilised 
in the power relations within the board, and with the association' s executive. 
In all chapters, we draw on our interviews with key actors and our work with 
Wandland.
We wish to state at the outset that we were extremely grateful to all members 
of Wandland HA, at board and officer level, who granted us access to all parts 
of their organisation. They did so without question and engaged with us about 
our research questions. Indeed, from the researchers’ perspective, they were 
a model organisation with which to work. We have provided them with a 
shorter report of our research findings, which is attached as Appendix A.6
2 POLICY BACKGROUND
The first LSVT of a local authority’s housing stock occurred in or around 1988 
by a transfer from Chiltern DC to Chiltern Hundreds HA. This was quite a 
remarkable event for two reasons. First, it occurred beyond the state, so to 
speak. It was a process set in train by housing managers, and not by local 
government councillors nor by central government. The problem of the time 
was the increasing control exercised over local housing authorities by central 
government, particularly in terms of financial controls. Local authorities were 
forced to cut their new developments and programmes of repair and 
rehabilitation as financial and accounting controls inhibited them. 
Furthermore, the rhetoric was that these controls were the thin end of the 
wedge – central government was intent on further controlling the sector. 
It should be said at the outset that an LSVT involves a significant shift in the 
web of available accountability mechanisms. Local authorities are publicly 
accountable organisations, and, where things go wrong, that accountability 
can ensue through a variety of different locations (through the ballot box, or 
the web of regulatory bodies designed to call such public sector organisations 
to account). RSLs operate in a netherworld, between the public and the 
private. They are neither one nor the other. The web of regulatory bodies to 
which they are responsible are different from local authorities. RSLs are 
primarily accountable to the Housing Corporation, a state-run quango, which 
is responsible, perhaps uniquely, both for the regulation of RSLs as well as 
their part-funding. However, the Audit Commission, which has a statutory 
responsibility to set performance indicators for and audit local authorities, now 
has the role of inspecting RSLs with more than 500 homes. Inspection 
'focuses on service delivery outcomes as experienced by tenants, 
leaseholders and other service users' (Ashby, 2005: 10). RSLs may also be 
subject to regulation by the Financial Services Authority and/or the Charity 
Commission, depending on their legal status..
Whilst the Housing Corporation and the Audit Commission have a 
responsibility to consider the views of  tenants, leaseholders and other service 
users, direct accountability to the occupiers  is not part of the web of 
accountability, in the way that council tenants could call their local councillor 
to account. Like local authorities ,RSLs have duties to engage occupiers in 
consultation and many go beyond this to include occupiers in decision-
making. Local authorities are required by guidance to have in place ‘Tenant 
Participation Compacts’ and the Housing Corporation requires RSLs to have 
similar policies in place.
The popularity of LSVT has continued unabated – indeed, one might say that, 
of all innovations in housing, it has proved to be the most popular, durable, 
and most significant in terms of transformation of the ‘social housing’ sector. 7
By the end of 2004, about 780,000 properties had been transferred to an RSL 
under an LSVT, costing around £5.5 billion. 
Certainly, LSVT was embraced by a privatising Conservative government. 
Nevertheless, what has been most surprising has been the way the New 
Labour government has developed and extended the programme beyond its 
original ‘drip-fed’ base. Such has been its impact that, under the decent 
homes strategy (under which councils are required to consider their ‘housing 
options’ – that is, how to finance the required scale of repairs and 
improvements to their housing stock to bring that stock up to the required 
standard), councils are effectively given a push towards LSVT. In order to 
obtain investment to meet the 2010 target, authorities have only three options 
from which they may choose: stock transfer, usually under the LSVT 
programme; the private finance initiative; and, for 'high performing authorities' 
only, Arms Length Management Organisations (ALMOs) (ODPM, 2004a: 16). 
There is no 'fourth option' of allowing local authorities to tackle the problems 
themselves, as Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott made clear in a letter to 
all local authorities on 29
th October 2004.
Significant implications of LSVT
The principal reason for promoting the programme of LSVT has been 
financial. In the mid-1980s the RSL sector had succeeded in persuading the 
Treasury that RSLs could be regarded as private, risk-bearing bodies, not 
organisations that were part of the public sector. This changed status meant 
that any private loans that associations were able to negotiate to fund the 
development of social housing would not be counted as public spending. In 
other words, extra funding had been 'levered in' to social housing in a mix of 
public grants and private loans. When a local authority transferred its housing 
stock to an RSL, the local authority usually received a capital receipt for the 
stock (depending on value, stock condition and other factors). In addition, this 
change in status from public to private, which could be seen as simply an 
accounting sleight of hand, enabled the RSL to implement a programme of 
repairs and improvements without affecting the public sector borrowing 
requirement. Both the purchase and the repair programme would be funded 
by loan, to be repaid out of rents received. 
The second significant impact of LSVT has been in the governing 
arrangements. The effect of the LSVT was to place the housing stock outside 
the direct control of both central and local government. The RSL created for 
the purpose, in theory, was an organisation which was self-governing within 
the regulatory confines of the Housing Corporation and its regulatory 
embrace. Within this new structure, it was the board of the RSLthat was 
ultimately responsible and accountable for the actions of the organisaion. 
From a governance point of view, the change from public to private has been 
highly significant since now, from the outset, the new RSL carries a large loan 
debt. The board must meet the regulatory requirements whilst at the same 
time ensuring that the organisation is able to repay its loans. Indeed, the 
requirement to meet loan conditions is enshrined into the Housing 8
Corporation's Regulatory Code (see Chapter 8).The RSL business plan 
becomes the key document for the board, as well as for its funders.
The third significant impact of transfer is in the contractual arrangements 
between the occupiers of the social housing and the new RSL. Local authority 
occupiers take under agreements which give them ‘secure tenancies’. This 
means, in practice, that they have certain rights against the local authority 
(including, for example, tenant participation, right to repair, the right to 
consultation); and they have security of tenure so that the local authority may 
only evict them if they have proved a particular ground (for example, rent 
arrears of a certain duration) and it is reasonable to do so. RSLs, on the other 
hand, generally give ‘assured tenancies’, similar to private landlords. RSL 
occupiers take with no similar rights under the contract, although the Housing 
Corporation expects occupiers to be given those rights (thus, potentially 
creating a legitimate expectation); and RSL occupiers can be evicted also on 
certain mandatory grounds including rent arrears (that is, there is no need to 
prove that eviction is reasonable, it generally follows automatically if there are 
rent arrears outstanding at the date of the hearing).
Benefits of Transfer
The innovation of LSVT was that, in theory, it offered benefits to staff 
managing the housing, occupiers of the housing, the local authority and 
central government.
For housing officers, it offered the opportunity to escape a depressed sector 
and engage in the same job, but in a more optimistic climate. They were 
generally guaranteed the same job with the new organisation. As one author 
has suggested:
Transfer brings the prospect of working for a growing, rather than a declining, 
organisation; of greater autonomy in being able to plan over the medium term, rather 
than on a strictly annual cycle; of less interference by elected politicians; and of 
improved working conditions, with higher status and enhanced career progression, as 
well as better salaries and fringe benefits. In general officers may see greater 
opportunities in the more entrepreneurial and innovative atmosphere of a new 
organisation than in the bureaucratic, scrutinised approach of the local authority.
(Kleinman, 1993: 169)
A further benefit of an LSVT was that it enabled the officers to escape the 
financial strictures imposed by central government. The LSVT, as a self-
governing organisation could put in place its own programme of development 
and repairs/improvements.
For the occupiers, the principal benefits were said to be, first, that a transfer to 
an RSL was, perhaps paradoxically, the least change option. With central 
government controls over local housing stock becoming more significant over 
time, and uncertain prospects for the sector as a whole, transfer offered the 
opportunity of stability albeit with a new landlord. Even though the landlord 
was new, generally all the housing officers would transfer to the new RSL.  9
Governance arrangements, although different, would not directly impact on 
most occupiers. Indeed, the direct impact of transfer on occupiers was the 
prospect that the backlog of repairs and improvements to the housing stock 
would be speeded up, with a programme put in place. 
Occupiers also had the opportunity for direct democracy – part of the transfer 
process requires a positive vote in favour of a transfer by a majority of 
tenants. Only then will a transfer be approved by the ODPM. As part of the 
‘offer’ made to occupiers, they are usually given a guarantee that their rent will 
not increase above a certain percentage point every year for five years. Such 
a guarantee generally does not apply to persons who take occupation of 
property after the transfer, and their rents are generally more expensive.
The benefit for the local authority was that it made a capital receipt which 
could be used to pay off historic debts and for other purposes (subject, after a 
while, to a financial levy imposed by the Treasury). LSVT, then, became an 
increasingly popular vehicle for local authorities (of whatever political hue) 
which can be seen both as benefiting the housing stock as well as the local 
authority.
For central government, the input of private finance meant that commitments 
to improve existing social housing and meet future housing needs could be 
met with a much reduced impact on public spending. 
Problems of transfer
The downsides of LSVT appear somewhere in the future. Five particular 
issues present themselves – first, financial risk; second, instability amongst 
officers; third, the role of the Housing Corporation; fourth, there is political risk; 
and fifth, changes in the nature of the occupation agreement after the transfer.
First, it introduces financial risk. This is a different form of financial risk from 
that which previously pertained. If interest payments to lenders are not 
maintained then (in theory) the lender can take possession of the property 
and sell it ‘over the heads’ of the occupiers. Private finance has been a 
significant feature of the RSL sector since the mid-1980s and the sector now 
regulates itself largely for the benefits of the private lending constituency 
(Mullins, 1997). For example, the practice of producing accounts has altered 
to make RSL accounts similar to those produced by PLCs, which are more 
readily understandable to lenders. However, the sector operates against the 
backdrop of considerable comfort for lenders. The supervisory role of the 
Housing Corporation  means that RSLs are not allowed to get into a position 
where they need to default on loans. If an RSL gets into difficulties, the 
Corporation will put their own nominees onto the board, and can even force a 
merger or takeover. Therefore, although lenders will conduct their own tests of 
the strength of the organisation, they see the sector as very low risk , which 
may result in a better deal between RSL and lender.
Although loan agreements have tended to be quite traditional – indeed similar 
to that taken out by the average owner-occupier – they have been the subject 10
of innovation. Such innovation is likely to have an effect on the willingness of 
the lender to loan money as well as the interest rate. Where only one lender is 
willing to lend money against the assets, that is likely to lead to ‘uncompetitive
pricing of the loan. It should be noted that the RSL negotiates with the lender, 
but the negotiation takes place against the backdrop of the local authority’s 
capital demand for its stock. As the CML representative put it,
ultimately I mean the big deal breaker early on is the amount of money they want to 
raise vis a vis the value of the asset.  And there’s often a tension there between the 
local authority’s ambition for a receipt and the putative RSL’s debt servicing capacity.  
And I mean in previous epochs that’s been if you like a tension in which the lender in 
a sense has played a role in sort of giving outline view about what they think they’re 
prepared to fund.  So you know an authority that was seeking a very substantial 
receipt would run up against the tension of the lender saying well it isn’t worth that. 
(CML)
However, the lender also closely scrutinises the management and 
governance arrangements of the new board. In particular, the question is the 
extent to which it can meet its financial commitments from its income.
As we have said, the financial risk of repossession and sale by the lender is, 
however, slight. However, there are other options open to lenders in cases 
where associations may have difficulties meeting their borrowing 
committments. For example, as the CML representative suggested, some 
lenders take the view that the agreement between the RSL and occupiers 
regarding rent increases is breakable, although practice is different on this 
point:
I mean crucially for example, and an LSVT is a very good example, one lender, 
maybe more than one lender, has taken the view that the 5 year contract with the 
tenants is breakable.  In other words, if there is cashflow problems you simply break 
it.  Now what they’ve done in a sense is they’ve narrowed their assumptions and 
therefore they’ve increased in their lending to reflect that.  Now that’s a sort of 
philosophical, it’s a commercial decision as well.  But obviously other lenders have 
taken the view ‘no, that contract is sacrosanct’, and therefore we have to build in the 
margins to allow that to happen.
A further, different, aspect of financial risk lies in the rent guarantee at the end 
of the 5 year period. The assumption is that, at this stage, the rents will have 
to rise, sometimes considerably, to meet the historic backlog of repairs and 
improvements as well as to service the debt to the lender. The assumption is 
that, as a significant proportion of the occupiers are in receipt of housing 
benefit, the welfare state will effectively fund most of the occupiers’ rent 
increases. Such an assumption involves a clear political risk.
The second problem of transfer concerns the housing officers themselves. 
Although most officers tend to transfer over to the new RSL, it is anecdotally 
remarked that they tend to move on relatively quickly. The new organisation 
involves a radically different culture, one in which entrepreneurialism and risk 
are often regarded as key values, and which drive on development. 
Throughout the organisation, personnel changes are said to be significant. 
However, as the CML representative said, this particularly affects senior staff:11
I mean on the executive side there’s a major issue about the capacity of the staff, 
which often are transfer staff, to manage the new organisation.  And if you look at the 
history of LSVTs, I mean I’ve not seen any empirics done on this, it’s about time there 
were really.  But the empirics on this would demonstrate that actually an awful lot of 
the designated chief executives have not lasted much more than a year or so into the 
new organisation. … There’s been an enormous fall off problem.  And it’s by and 
large because the whole context and circumstance is different within if you like the 
family of the authority, and outwith the family of the authority.  
Third, and this will be discussed further below, the regulatory embrace of the 
Housing Corporation is significant. The Corporation’s requirements, combined 
with that of the Audit Commission’s inspection process and ‘key lines of 
enquiry’, are significant in terms of the production of performance indicators 
as well as the required regulatory oversight. In addition, the Corporation has 
powers of supervision and management of RSLs in certain circumstances. 
Under these powers, the Corporation can place persons on governing boards. 
These powers have been particularly used in the case of LSVT RSLs. 
Furthermore, the Corporation has other more subtle methods of oversight at 
its disposal – which might be subsumed within the heading of ‘regulatory 
conversations’, at different levels (for example, sometimes with the threat of 
exercising their formal powers). As the Housing Corporation representative 
put it:
certainly it's the case that there's a high probability that new stock transfer 
organisations will go into supervision.  It's not always the case but there's a higher 
probability that they will than other organisations.  But that seems to me to be 
consistent with the fact that they are new organisations with relatively high risk 
businesses, that involve borrowing a lot of money ... and starting from scratch.  Um ... 
But ultimately those problems will have been dealt with in almost all cases by boards 
themselves.  And we've often intervened in some way but never to the extent of 
winding up operations.
The fourth issue concerns the ongoing relationship between RSL and local 
authority. This is an important relationship which requires ongoing 
management and oversight. A break down in this relationship can affect the 
ongoing viability of the LSVT RSL as the local authority is primarily 
responsible for introducing new occupiers – from the housing register or 
homelessness system – and the local authority can also affect the 
development opportunities available to the RSL. Equally, a proportion of the 
capital from sales under the ‘right to buy’ is taken by the local authority. 
Where the local authority is in an ongoing relationship with the RSL, that 
money may well be fed back to the RSL in different ways. As the LGA 
representative made clear, the benefits to RSLs of a close relationship with 
their local authority are clear:
And that RSLs should be willing to actually sit down and say hang on a minute, let's 
talk to the council about what the plan is for the district, for unitary, or even 
subregionally.  Because if they don't come along with that and they're going off doing 
something different they'll probably find that their business plan doesn't stack up 
anyway.  But if they contribute to what the council is doing they'll probably find that 
they can cut costs as well.  Because you can find I think a really strong business case 
for having ... you know how services interlink and the money you can save on those 
services.  12
The fifth point concerns the residents’ occupation rights under the new 
organisation. These rights shift from being ‘secure tenancies’ to ‘assured 
tenancies’. This shift is significant on the face of it, in terms of the formal legal 
position. Assured tenancies have market rents and occupiers can be more 
easily evicted for non-payment of rent – where there is two or more months 
rent arrears, then the RSL is entitled to mandatory possession. Local 
authorities are only entitled to possession where it would be reasonable, and 
this is, therefore, subject to judicial discretion. Formally, local authorities owe 
duties of consultation and the provision of information to occupiers under 
secure tenancies, whereas RSLs have no similar duties. However, the 
Housing Corporation has ameliorated most differences through the 
promulgation of regulations and guidance. As regards the mandatory 
possession ground for rent arrears, the Corporation does not forbid its use, 
but suggests that:
Before using Ground 8, associations should first pursue all other reasonable 
alternatives to recover the debt. Where the use of Ground 8 forms part of an arrears 
and eviction policy, tenants should have been consulted and governing board 
approval for the policy should have been given. (Housing Corporation, 2004: para. 
3.1.4)
Rights to consultation and information have, however, tended to be equalised 
with secure tenants through performance standards criteria combined with 
Audit Commission inspections. Thus, the method of enforcement has 
changed from judicial to a more intrusive mode.
These doubts about LSVT, particularly as regards the potential for future 
discord, have meant that LSVT is not necessarily an assured deal. They 
involve considerable political negotiation with, and amongst, all the key 
stakeholders in the process. The results of tenants' ballots have been close, 
and there have been high profile votes against LSVT (for example, 
Birmingham and Camden), as well as 'NO' votes in a range of rural and mixed 
authorities across England..
Comparability
Although shrouded with the mystique and acronyms usually associated with 
housing, LSVT processes are, in one sense, pioneering forms of 
transformation within the welfare state more generally. The transfer from 
public to private (or quasi-public) organisation, the levering into the sector of 
private finance, the shift towards entrepreneurialism and risk-based practices 
will be familiar to any welfare state watcher. The contractualisation of public 
services such as education, health, and waste collection, is a feature of 
modern welfare states. These may be regarded as parallel, but by no means 
identical, developments, and lessons learnt in one arena are not necessarily 
transferable to another formerly publicly provided service. Thus, a 
representative from the ODPM pointed out that there are significant 
differences between school governing boards and LSVTs: 13
ODPM1: I mean there is a parallel there, um I think they're very different things … 
because the issues on the ground are very different. I think you know, providing 
someone’s education, and a quality education in a fairly rigorous framework, as lain 
down by, you know, central government. Um and about (pause) you're focusing on 
the role of that one school, whereas I think if you're an elected member, you know if 
you're a Board member of an RSL with 11,000 properties, and 11,000 … tenants and 
all that goes with that, is a much broader responsibility, I would suggest. Um I'm not 
downplaying the role of school governors by any stretch of the imagination, but I think 
the scale is different.
I:  So it’s an issue of scale?
ODPM1:  Scale, and I think the scope, that they have much broader scope and much 
more discretion in how they operate as an organisation, is my guess, knowing nothing 
about school governors…
ODPM2: Its also the range of activities isn’t it? That RSLs do, its not only about 
housing, its so much else that goes with it.
In short, there are differences across the regulation and governance of each 
particular sector. Additionally, the types of activities in which each particular 
sector engages may well go beyond that sector in diverse ways.
New forms of governance
Above we highlighted that one of the significant changes brought about by 
LSVT was in the form of governance. Registered social landlords, as 
independent bodies, are ultimately controlled by a board of governors. Most 
RSLs, if they are set up as Industrial and Provident Societies, also have 
shareholders. Each shareholder will have a £1 share, which does not provide 
dividends. Shareholding is used by some associations as a way of widening 
out their community base. Shareholders, in theory, control the membership of 
the board of governors, and can vote off governors at the Annual General 
Meeting. However, in the RSL sector, shareholder power minimal, if it exists 
at all.
So why do RSLs have boards of governors? The National Housing Federation 
provides two answers to this question: first, it is a legal requirement - 'without 
a board, housing organisations do not have a legal existence' (Rochester & 
Hutchinson, 2001: 1). Secondly, the same authors claim that 
boards add value to the organisation. Board members may bring a range of 
knowledge, thoughts and questions which are wider that the experiemnce of staff. 
And effective board will perform a number of useful functions that contribute to the 
health of the organisation and its ability to achieve its aims (ibid).
The Federation's Code sets out what it describes as 'the essential functions of 
the Board' (NHF, 2004: 12), of which the following duties are to be considered 
a minimum standard:
1. define and ensure compliance with the values and objectives of the 
association;14
2. establish a framework for approving policies and plans to achieve 
those objectives;
3. approve each year's accounts prior to publication and approve each 
year’s budget and business plan;
4. establish and oversee a framework of delegation and systems of 
internal control;
5. establish and oversee a framework for the identification and 
management of risk, ensuring that the board receives regular reports 
on these;
6. agree or ratify policies and decisions on all matters that might create 
significant financial or other risk to the association, or which raise 
material issues of principle; 
7. monitor the association's performance in relation to these plans, 
budgets, controls and decisions and also in the light of customer 
feedback and the performance of comparable organisations; 
8. appoint (and, if necessary, dismiss) the Chief Executive and approve 
his or her salary, benefits and terms of employment;
9. satisfy itself that the association's affairs are conducted lawfully and in 
accordance with generally accepted standards of performance and 
probity;
10.assess how the association follows the recommendations of this Code 
of governance; and
11.follow the organisation’s constitution in appointing (and, if necessary, 
removing) the chair of the board.
Conclusion
From the preceding chapter it can be seen that our research project is set is 
within a many layered framework. The LSVT is a new organisation that from 
the outset is constrained by a number of factors: the guarantee given to 
tenants in the ballot for transfer; the requirements of the ODPM, and the 
regulatory requirements of the Housing Corporation, the Audit Commission 
and other public and private regulators; and the financial risk of a very large 
loan and the concomitant expectations of its financiers. 15
3 METHODOLOGY
At the outset, our work focused on the role of tenants as members of the 
board of governors. We were interested in exploring the power relationships 
operating in the governing board as they affected tenant occupiers. This was 
based on the assumption that tenant board members were collected from an 
already marginalized body – tenant occupiers more generally of social 
housing. However, at an early stage, we expanded this question as it became 
apparent that we needed to look at the board of governors as a whole. Only 
then could we identify what each constituent grouping on the board could 
offer, what they perceived to be barriers as well as possibilities, and consider 
the range of interactions within the board. Indeed, it became apparent at an 
early stage in our research that similar barriers and tensions existed for the 
councillor board members, and that the range of questions concerning 
expertise were also apt when considering the role/s of independent board 
members.
Our research questions identified in the introduction called for the use of a 
qualitative, as opposed to a quantitative, approach. Indeed, given the range of 
our enquiry, it was clear that the methods we used needed also to be flexible 
and diverse. We chose to carry out an intensive study of board members 
which could then be analysed and compared with the assumed version of 
truth by national bodies.
Our approach involved three phases.
 A literature review
 Semi-structured interviews with key persons in national organisations
 A study of one LSVT RSL which was in the process of being created 
(‘Wandland’)
At the outset, we needed to establish the terrain of the debate. Whilst the 
principal investigators have been involved in housing research and practice 
for some time, we were fortunate to be able to choose a research assistant 
(RA) who came with a background in more generic social science training. 
That appointment meant that the principal investigators’ understandings could 
be challenged, disrupted, and reconstructed by the RA from the point of view 
of her own expertise, at times challenging the 'common sense' views built up 
by years of exposure to the housing system. The literature review was 
conducted by the RA under the supervision of the principal investigators. This 
inter-disciplinary approach yielded considerable rewards as we came to refine 
our research questions, and indeed question the prevailing corporate 
governance wisdom. 16
The review focused on both academic discussions as well as policy 
documents. It focused on the role of boards of governors generally, with a 
more specific consideration given over to the role of tenants. The more 
specific consideration can be justified because this is where most academic 
and policy blood has been spilt. In particular, the review considered the 
relationship between broad tenant participation strategies and the more 
specific role of tenants as board members. We believed that broad tenant 
participation strategies were likely to be related in some way to the more 
specific role. However, it became apparent that they were not related 
(although, as we discuss below, they may subsequently impact on each other) 
and they had grown up quite independently of each other. The theoretical 
relationship between the two is slight. Indeed, in practice, the blending of the 
two can be problematic, as was expressed by one of our key actors in phase 
2:
There is a discontinuity between tenant engagement and tenants on boards. It is 
assumed that having tenants on the board means that the LSVT is getting the tenant 
perspective. Tenants on boards is not the same thing as tenant participation. (TPAS)
The literature review enabled us to sharpen our thoughts about the role of 
board members. In brief, we devised three models of this role: as consumers; 
as representatives; or as strategists. Each of these models has some basis in 
the literature, but each is contested.
In the second phase, we conducted semi-structured interviews with a number 
of key actors from a variety of different agencies. Most of the interviews were 
conducted face-to-face, with two conducted by phone. Appendix B contains 
our outline interview questionnaire. These interviews were designed to elicit 
the organisation’s perspective and views on the two research questions 
(organisational allegiance and expertise). What became apparent from these 
interviews was the diversity of opinions expressed by these actors. This might 
have been expected given their organisational basis, but it suggested that, 
first, our research questions are of importance to the housing practice 
community, and, second, that this is a contested and congested area, with 
numerous voices seeking to be heard. The following is the list of organisations 
interviewed:
 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM)
 Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH)
1
 Local Government Association (LGA)
 Council for Mortgage Lenders (CML)
 Housing Corporation
 National Housing Federation (NHF)
 Tenant Participation Advisory Service (TPAS)
In addition, we sought to familarise ourselves with the issues through 
discussion with a Chief Executive and Chair of an LSVT RSL which has been 
in existence for some time. Again, this helped to immerse ourselves further 
                                           
1  This interview was conducted by telephone.17
into the contestation as well as making us aware of some of the on-the-
ground issues which we might come across in the third phase of our work. We 
also met with a journalist who had served as a board member of an RSL, but 
had resigned as a result of a set of governance issues. Finally, we met with a 
large-scale lender to discuss what kinds of issues they consider before 
lending money to an LSVT RSL. 
In the third phase, we focused on one LSVT RSL which was in the process of 
being created in an area which, for the purposes of anonymity and 
confidentiality, we call ‘Wandland’. Wandland Housing Association was in the
process of becoming an RSL, and, subject to the final decision of Wandland 
Council, to acquire all the housing stock of Wandland District Council. 
Wandland Council is a district council with a mixture of urban (medium-sized 
town) and rural housing. It is located in close proximity to a major city that is 
the principal regional centre. The council has been down the LSVT route 
before (in the early 1990s), although it failed at that point apparently as a 
result of political disagreements and tenants voting against transfer. The 
Council began to investigate voluntary transfer again in the early 2000s when 
Wandland was a hung Council. The Council subsequently approved the stock 
options appraisal, which called for an LSVT as the most appropriate option. 
The Council then began preparations for another tenant ballot. A Shadow 
Board for the new RSL was formed. During the period of our research, the 
shadow board became a full board, the association received the pre-
registration visit from the Housing Corporation, and the LSVT executed.
This choice of focusing on just one LSVT RSL was made both for practical 
and academic reasons. Our research questions required that the research 
team gain an in-depth understanding of this organisation. Equally, the 
questions demanded a combination of qualitative methods in relation to this 
organisation. We needed to find out what board members thought about their 
role, how they constructed expertise, as well as their day-to-day interactions 
with each other. We were, in some respects, particularly fortunate that 
Wandland HA was a newly formed RSL as it was effectively a blank canvas. 
There are two points: it is at an early stage that board members’ interaction 
may become ingrained and early capture of this data can highlight points 
which are subsequently obscured; secondly, the early stage of development 
meant that the board were effectively learning together and there were 
structured training sessions put in place for the members to appreciate the 
governance, finance and development, as well as practice issues, involved in 
being a member of an RSL board of governors.
There were essentially five stages to this part of the research which was 
conducted between July and December 2005:
 Analysis of literature associated with the transfer of Wandland 
Council’s housing stock, including the options review, local media 
stories, general documentation provided to potential board members, a 
video promoting the transfer to tenants, other internal documents.
 Semi-structured interviews with board members (n=15). These 
interviews lasted between about 20 minutes and two hours. We 18
explored with the interviewees their reasons for joining the board, as 
this might be likely to impact on how they managed the complexity of 
their roles as board members. Indeed, their motivation may highlight 
issues concerning their allegiance to the organisation. We discussed 
how they were appointed to the board, as this is also relevant to that 
organisational allegiance. We asked how they managed the complexity 
of their roles as board members. Finally, we asked what skills and 
expertise they felt that they brought to the board.
 Observation of board meetings and a sample of sub-committee 
meetings (n=3/3). Here, we were looking at the interactions between 
the board members as well as how those interactions reflected on the 
construction of expertise. We were provided with the agenda and 
documents of these meetings in an electronic format.
 Observation of training sessions (n=3) and an interview with the 
training manager (n=1). The training sessions were observed to obtain 
firsthand appreciation of the ‘skilling up’ process of becoming a board 
member as well as their usefulness in developing knowledge and 
expertise, and as a site at which interactions around expertise between 
the board members might become apparent.
 A final stage involved interviews with a sample of senior housing 
officers and the recently appointed Chief Executive, Finance Director, 
and Development manager (n=7). These interviews were used to test 
our preliminary findings and develop an appreciation of two further 
issues: first, the process of appointing the original board; and second, 
how understandings about the conflicts involved in board membership 
were being resolved.
Appendix C contains our outline interview questionnaires.
We transcribed our notes of the observations and interviews, and scanned 
hard copy documents provided by Wandland HA into an electronic format. All 
the data, including electronic data, was anonymised at the point at which it 
was placed into our database. Our research methods were designed with data 
protection issues at the forefront. The identity of our human participants will 
be anonymised; all codings and data will be retained confidentially. The 
stories told by our research participants will be anonymised at transcription. 
This included anonymisation of the organisations, as well as of all 
interviewees and other personnel. Interviewees are referred to by number 
(Councillor 1 or Officer 1, for example).
All participants were made aware of the ambit of the project in advance of 
their involvement. We prepared a note about the project, which contained 
details about the project together with the contact details of the Principal 
Investigator. The note was distributed to both the board and all potential 
participants at an early stage. The Board agreed to assisting us with our 
research both collectively at a board meeting and individually at the interview. 
No board member refused to be interviewed. We advised members that they 
were entitled to withdraw their involvement with the project at any time.19
At an early stage of the project, we decided to use a qualitative data analysis 
package to assist us. Bristol University had recently bought a site licence to 
use the NVivo package. Once we had collected all the data electronically, we 
loaded it onto Nvivo for the purposes of analysis. We developed certain broad 
codings from our literature review and developed these, in a grounded way, 
as we read through our transcripts and observations. This was the first time 
any of us had used Nvivo and we determined to use it partly because, 
although our project collected a significant amount of data, it was relatively 
small-scale. The benefits of using Nvivo have been significant –
 it gave us the opportunity to develop codes as we went through our 
data, and thus our theory was similarly able to be grounded in our data; 
 its manipulability as a research tool has meant that the process of 
writing up has been made easier; 
 it facilitated the process of joint working in a number of ways, most 
significantly through the production of a log which not only detailed 
what each of us had done at any particular time, but also enabled us to 
highlight emerging themes, and develop key learning points and our 
theory; 
 although there is the prospect of data being lost, as with any electronic 
method, Nvivo also facilitates the process of data saving more 
effectively than paper-based systems.
 the process of reporting on our codes, sorting and matching them, has 
significantly facilitated data analysis.
However, there is a downside. At times, electronic reading and coding can 
become a merely technical, mechanical process, as a result of which data 
analysis can become shallow. We recognised this and sought to guard 
against it by limiting the time spent per day on data analysis, and by ensuring 
that at least two members of the team coded each document.
As with all qualitative research, we caution against our data being 
exaggerated, made representative of the sector as a whole, and over-
generalised. This is but one LSVT RSL at its early stage of development. It is 
neither meant to be nor discussed as a representative study. However, some 
of the themes that emerged are likely to strike a chord at least amongst LSVT 
RSLs, as well as in some 'traditional' housing associations and other similar 
organisations. 20
4 CASE STUDY: 
BACKGROUND ISSUES
Before we discuss our case study data in detail, there are a number of 
preliminary issues which, whilst not directly relevant to our research 
questions, are, in fact, of background importance. In other words, they are not 
determinative, but indicators of approach and background understandings 
about the sector. The two principal issues are: getting involved; and the 
nature of the organisation. A person might get involved in an LSVT RSL for a 
variety of reasons, which may well affect their approach to the key questions. 
For example, a person who becomes involved for political reasons is unlikely 
to sign up to the ‘neutral allegiance model’. Similarly, if one understands the 
nature of the organisation to be essentially private/commercial, this is likely to 
impact on one’s approach to the organisation and its development.
Getting Involved
Why did our interviewee board members seek their position? in all cases, they 
actively self-nominated or were nominated by others, such as the tenants’ 
forum. Although, in one sense, the answer to this question is simple – to ‘give 
something back’ – we explicitly asked about our interviewee board members’ 
backgrounds and why they decided to become involved at this level (as 
opposed to some other level, such as through tenant participation or council 
structures). One might anticipate that it takes something more, in terms of 
commitment and understanding, to seek membership of the board.
Interest in housing
For some interviewees, their motivation for becoming involved stemmed from 
a deep-seated interest – expressed by one as a passion – in housing, 
specifically low-cost, social or council housing. Councillor 2 had been brought 
up in a council house in the post-war period:
And I thought what a good service it was for whatever council it is providing it.  A 
great help.  Lots of people would never have … never managed to get any housing at 
all.
Indeed, he had become involved in tenant participation structures as an 
interested party and, when the time came for the councillors to be nominated 
to the board, the Chair of the housing committee asked him to accept the 
nomination:
I’d shown an interest voluntarily the executive member for housing suggested I put 
my name forward anyway.  And she’s of a different party to me.  So it was quite nice 
to think that I was offered by all concerned a place on the board.21
Independent 1 had been involved with RSLs for some time, from the days 
when they were driven and managed by the wealthy in smoke-filled rooms:
It was occupied by sort of middle class people that were theoretically doing some 
good, you know, and that was their motive.  To me you know they shouldn't be like 
that at all, you know.  They weren't driven by the sort of passion, they were just driven 
by do good, doing good.  And that isn't sufficient, you know.  But that was what it was 
35 years ago.  I mean I was the only working class person in the housing association 
and I ... you know the years I belonged to.
He had become involved at the request of his local vicar, whom he described 
as a ‘christian socialist’. He had been invited to join an RSL ‘because he knew 
somebody’. For Independent 1, there were three key issues with social 
housing: security, care and quality. He recognised that he may be a maverick, 
he had ‘spent my entire career being out of step with everybody else’.
Interest in housing could also arise, for tenants, from involvement in the 
structures of tenant participation. This could lead in to opportunities for 
training and further education in housing which impacted on their developing 
expertise. Two tenants were involved in tenant participation structures at least 
locally and regionally. Tenant 1’s imbrication within tenant participation 
structures stretched to the local, regional and national. Indeed, Tenant 1 had 
been involved in the development of tenant participation in Wandland in the 
early 1990s and had subsequently developed experience through 
membership of the Audit Commission’s Tenant Inspection Teams. Through 
these structures, Tenant 1 had built up an array of expertise:
[we] consciously then decided that we would try and attend every training we could 
that was useful to us as a resident’s group and everything else, and we did, and now I 
very rarely have to attend any training (laughs). Depending on what it is of course. 
And then of course I became a Tenant Inspection Advisor with the Audit Commission 
what, four and half years ago?
However, a number of interviewees disclaimed any prior interest in housing at 
all. For these people, motivations had to be found elsewhere. As Councillor 3 
put it:
I think it was a lack of interest based on a complete lack of knowledge … which is 
strange cos I was born and bred on a council estate …
‘Reaction’
Two tenant members specifically decided to become involved as a board 
member as a reaction to concerns about the representativeness of the 
tenants nominated for the board. Tenant 3 and Tenant 6 had decided to 
become involved for this reason, albeit with slightly different motivations. 
Tenant 3 had become concerned that the tenant participation structures 
reflected the urban parts of Wandland, whereas the outlying villages were 
unrepresented on the board:22
I was involved with a few other residents at the formation of a residents association 
here in Nister.  We don’t call it a tenants association because there’s more private 
than rented properties here.  So I very quickly realised that becoming involved in 
transfer was probably quite key to making sure that Nister as a village got its share of 
what was going around, rather than it all going to Bochester and the other big areas.  
So I really got involved on quite a selfish level really for the village.
Tenant 6, who had joined the board after the others, and by a different route 
(see below), had explicitly not been involved with tenant participation 
structures after an initial experience:
I: I just wondered have you been involved in tenants' groups or I mean ...
TEN6:  No. No no I've never bothered.  I've seen them and I've looked at them and 
I'm afraid I didn't consider myself ... the blue hairwash brigade, you know.  They're 
usually sort of older people who see what young people get today and then get an 
axe to grind because of it. 'We never had it when we was their age.'  And some don't 
want them to have it, and some think it's wrong.  You know.  Life moves on, things 
should be better for everybody
General Interest
This category was drawn on most particularly by the Independent members of 
the board. For the majority, they had little interest in housing but a general 
interest in business organisations or topics related to the LSVT RSL. For 
example, Independent 2 applied to join the board – ‘I bumped into it by 
accident’ - because this was a 
I suppose what attracted me was that it was a new company starting off, it was in 
housing and I'm a property lawyer, and there seemed to be a bit of a glut there. And it 
was sort of local and easy to get to.   And I felt because I'd been on the executive 
committee and effectively the managing board for my previous law firm for about 10 
years I felt I had some ... in some way I can contribute.
Independent 3 was seeking to ‘give a bit back to society’ and board 
membership was related to his current employment through which he had 
become aware of the problems of access to housing advice. Independent 4 
knew nothing about housing but had experience of asset management which 
he thought would be useful.
General interest would also apply to some of the councillor members. For 
example, Councillor 3 expressed no knowledge of his party’s position on 
housing, but he felt that he could offer business advice and experience. 
Councillor 5 had become involved as it was related to his main business as a 
property landlord. The only tenant who fell into this category was Tenant 5, 
who had acted as an OFSTED inspector and had been involved in education 
programmes. She felt that those skills were transferable.
‘That stage in life’23
For tenant and independent board members, a common reason for becoming 
involved was because they had reached a particular stage in their lives where 
they had more time on their hands. Independent 2 had recently moved from a 
very busy job, where he been on the executive committee and managing 
board, to a small firm. He felt that he needed ‘an interest in life’. Similarly, 
Tenant 1 said that she
spent the first 6 months of retirement in here, watching that [nods at the TV] , doing 
nothing.  And I didn't like it.  I didn't like it at all.
Tenant 2 said
Well, my husband died seven years ago, and it was a case of ‘what do you do with 
your life?’ I was fifty-four and you think well ‘what do you do with your life?’, you 
know?’. I was looking after the boys even then three days a week, so whatever I did 
had to sort of coincide with looking after grandchildren.
These interviewees also told us that the stage in life of most tenant board 
members was a concern, specifically about the dearth of interest amongst 
younger tenants.
Personal experience (general)
Beyond the personal experience of housing discussed above, a number of 
board members, particularly tenants discussed their personal experience as 
reasons for becoming involved. In particular, past experience in relation to 
family members with disabilities and past experience as an activist (Tenant 1) 
were cited as reasons. Tenant 1 described her past experience, where she 
had campaigned to stop the small hospital where she worked being closed 
down:
I'm sorry but I am a bit of an activist, I have been all my life, but I don't look ... I don't 
actually get active like going on marches or things like that, because I don't think 
people listen to that sort of thing.  Specially the people at the top of the ladder.  I don't 
think they listen, they're 'Oh God, they're off again', you know.
Councillor 1 had become involved because, although new to politics, her son 
had worked for an RSL and so she had some knowledge by that association.
Type of Organisation
This is a multi-million pound business, involving lots of people’s homes and jobs with 
substantial income borrowing and expenditure. (Board Member Application Pack)
There has been some discussion in the literature about the nature of an RSL. 
Specifically, does it ‘fit’ within the public or the private sector, or is it some 
hybrid of the two. We did not ask this question directly of any of our 
interviewees except the officers interviewed at the final stage of our fieldwork. 
Yet this question arose naturally during the interviews, underlying the 
importance of this background set of understandings. Furthermore, our 24
interviewees expressed different views on this question which also suggested 
that there may well be productive conflicts regarding the future development 
of the organisation.
What was particularly powerful about our interview data is the lack of available 
linguistic tools to describe the new organisation. The organisation had to be 
described by reference (or, more usually, by way of contrast) to some other 
more generic set of ideas – business (often ‘big business), private sector, 
local authority, public sector – which have some more accomplished 
understandings attached to them. There is no doubt, as the CML interviewee 
expressed, the LSVT RSL is a big local employer and has a large turnover 
particularly of rents. Wandland is no different in this regard. The FD 
expressed their understanding of the new organisation in this counterposed 
way:
I think we’re somewhere in between [public and private].  I think there’s a big danger 
in us thinking we are a purely a private sector organisation in that …we’ve got a fixed 
revenue stream. … You know, we’re not making and selling things and persuading 
customers to buy what we sell. … but equally we’re no longer in the pure public 
sector because we do have real responsibilities to people like funders who lend us 
money on commercial terms and expect us to meet certain criteria that you have to 
live up to otherwise you suffer real commercial uh penalties, you know of ultimately 
them selling your stock. I mean it never will happen but you know I think we’re 
somewhere in between. 
Counterposing Wandland
The two most apparent counterpositions were between the new LSVT RSL, 
on the one hand, and the public sector or ‘big business’, on the other hand. 
It was noticeable that few tenant board members sought to counterpose 
Wandland against big business (although that should not be taken to suggest 
that they did not regard it as a business – see below). Their usual point of 
reference was against the public sector and local authority control. As Tenant 
5 put it, the shift to an RSL represented an opportunity to move away from the 
‘embedded culture’ of the public sector. Here, for example, the location of the 
offices of Wandland became a ‘political’ issue. As Tenant 1 put it, 
I'm a great believer that the housing association should get well away from the 
council as an idea.  Cos I've stuck my neck on the block and said I want the head 
office out of Bochester.  So that it becomes ... the apron strings are cut. … my main 
object was to get them to move the building away from the council physically as well 
as mentally.
Similarly other interviewees generally sought to distance the RSL from the 
local authority. That being said, though, there was clearly a relationship and, 
not surprisingly, this relationship was most clearly expressed by councillor 
board member interviewees. After all, as Councillor 5 put it (perhaps naively), 
the RSL still has to house those on the waiting list and they will be working 
together. Councillor 4 argued that the relationship was close:25
[W]e [ie Wandland council] have a strategic role in delivering housing for our 
residents. And because of that I think we need to be able to, we can't just treat it as a, 
and there is, there is an absolute relationship between them, and they were our 
houses. And I think that as a result, it’s not just another housing association. There is 
a link that flows through from the local authority through the houses to the new Board. 
(emphasis added)
The hesitation, however, in expressing that relationship by Councillor 4 is 
palpable. It seems that for this person, the retention of the obligation to offer 
housing without any housing stock means that link is crucial. However, this 
councillor also recognised that such a link may be cut. Councillor 5, on the 
other hand, was more clear cut about the importance of this link:
Well I think working for the council is a lot different for working for a private 
organisation.  The ethos behind it is different isn't it?  Although it's not quite a private 
organisation, but obviously [officer] roles will be different and it'll be a different ethos. I 
think probably when you work for the council you're maybe dragged down and held 
back, be very cautious so to speak.  Where obviously in the private sector it's be 
dynamic and go and get it.  But as I said obviously your housing association isn't the 
private.
Councillor 3, however, sought to justify councillor board membership through 
the retention of this link and the need for some public or social understanding 
at the heart of the new board:
Um, because you know I think in the transfer process and the setting out and the 
establishment of housing authority I believe that there needs to be some agency or 
other that is actually maintaining the values that social housing had when they were a 
local authority issue ... um, maintains or enhances the standard.  And ensures that 
the housing body is run according to the social values which it espouses, rather than 
run on a commercial landlord base.  And there are those particular tensions in 
individuals within the group
There were similar discussions during our interviews over whether Wandland 
was a ‘big business’ and a private sector going concern. Our Housing 
Corporation interviewee, although not totally consistent on this point, argued 
that the skills set required of board members was private sector (in the 
context of discussion about tenant participation) because running an LSVT 
RSL was running a business:
the Board side is about running a business, and I may be in a minority here but I feel 
when you're sitting on a Board of an organisation which is you know, has a turnover 
of millions of pounds, and as well as having a community focus, you have to think like 
a business person, its not about, I don’t think that’s tenant participation but running a 
business, but having, the fact that you are a tenant within in an organisation is the 
skill that you're bringing to that, to that Board
Councillor 2 also saw the new RSL as a big business:
it’s bound to be that it’s a big business, and all big businesses have a board of 
directors to oversee them, to set policies and strategies.
Independent 1 counterposed the new RSL from local authority control by 
regarding it as a business. For this person, 26
And I think they were looking really for somebody that had some experience of a 
housing association as distinct from a local authority housing set-up.  You know it's a 
very different creature, very different animal to ... you know running a housing 
association today is a business.  Whereas I think local authority housing is ... you 
know they try to make it a business but it's still got all this protection that housing 
associations don't have.
This was also Independent 3’s position, although this was a ‘business that 
should be delivering what the, all the clients need’. Thus, for this person, the 
name of the new organisation became something of a symbol. The name 
needed to signify a paradigm change, although he became convinced 
otherwise:
I must admit, (laughs) I wasn’t that bothered but I did feel that we should be seen to 
be something very significant, different from the council, and Wandland Housing to 
me didn’t signal enough of a difference. But I was persuaded, particularly by the 
tenant members that it was important for tenants to see the connectivity.
Similarly Officer 3 regarded the new organisation as business but one which
I think it sits between the two. … I think it leaves public sector behind, but it doesn’t 
go as far as BP, IBM, it doesn’t sit there. So you have this sort of quasi sort of 
business that sits somewhere in the middle.
However, there were also those who expressed concerns about the equation 
of LSVT RSLs with big business or just private sector ethic. David Walker, 
whose personal experience as a recently ousted member of a large LSVT, 
was brought to bear on this issue during his interview:
the Housing Corporation has a model which says that these are hot shit organisations 
which should be more like PLCs, therefore we've got have people with financial skills, 
therefore we’ve got have people with all these, this alleged skill set, which moves you 
further and further away from the idea that they are organisations, and pardon me for 
using this old fashioned word, ministering, helping people who are poor. I mean I 
think there is a fundamental issue there. I know conventional wisdom these days says 
you know, business, you can be a business and social enterprise, but I still there are 
you know, unanswered questions.
Councillor 3, whose background was as a business person, made clear that 
there was a slip that was easy to make:
it's easy for me to see this as a business and you know bland and financial thing, but 
I need to be continually reminded there are people in there who are living in 
conditions that I wouldn't be my dog to be (inaudible).  And that we have that as a 
priority we need to be doing that, rather than pleasing the bulk of the people.
Perhaps the best example of this counterposition concerned the question we 
asked about how board members perceived officers’ roles to change after the 
transfer process had been completed. This question demonstrated the 
uncertainties and contradictions over the type of organisation being created 
(private/public/social). These contradictions were expressed, for example by 
Councillor 5 who, initially, described the process as a transfer from public to 
private but subsequently became more hesitant in the description:27
Well I think working for the council is a lot different for working for a private 
organisation.  The ethos behind it is different isn't it?  Although it's not quite a private 
organisation, but obviously their roles will be different and it'll be a different ethos. I 
think probably when you work for the council you're maybe dragged down and held 
back, be very cautious so to speak.  Where obviously in the private sector it's be 
dynamic and go and get it.  But as I said obviously your housing association isn't the 
private.  But you've still got to be quite cautious.
Independent 1 and 2 described the big ‘cultural shift’ required of officers. 
Independent 2 described the way one can ‘instinctively know’ that officers 
work for a local authority: ‘it’s like when you go into school and you come out 
smelling of school meals’. Independent 1 described local authority 
employment (in which he had been employed) as ‘make believe’:
I wonder if they will really always appreciate just how big the change will be, you 
know, the cultural change, the ethos and the vision that they need to have rather than 
you know the stagnation approach, whereas - we've always done it like this and it 
worked previously.
What is Wandland?
Most board members and officers described Wandland using some notion of 
‘in-betweenness’. Thus, it was described as a ‘charitable not-for-profit 
organisation’ (CE); ‘social business’ (Officer 4); ‘non-profit-making community 
business’ (Tenant 5); ‘a private company with a social conscience’ (Tenant 6). 
There were two reasons generally given for this in-betweenness. First, 
Wandland was not a profit-making organisation. It should make a surplus for 
re-investing (not so that the officers could have bigger lunches: Tenant 6). 
The organisation should be well-run and ‘make the money work for us as best 
way they can’. Second, Wandland was there to serve its customers (a 
descriptor used by a number of interviewees). Officer 4 described this by 
reference to a discussion amongst officers about the mission statement:
we were talking the other day… we were looking through our things, like our mission 
statement, and we were saying how nice it was to have an organisation that had 
some kind of social role, because we were saying you know, if we were sat… if we 
were working for Unilever, we were sat down trying to write our mission statement 
we’d be saying things like ‘Make more money’,  … you know, because that is there 
ultimate aim, and that’s clearly not our ultimate aim.
However, underlying these statements of value/s, there seemed to be a 
degree of conflict, or just lack of consensus. For example, whilst the new RSL 
was not regarded as a profit-making organisation, that did not mean to say 
that it should not maximise its income. A useful example of the issues raised 
here is what the new organisation’s approach should be to the question of 
rent arrears amongst tenants. This was discussed at a board meeting – to put 
it another way, just how hard should the new organisation be on non-
payment. Councillor 2, in our interview, argued that the council had ‘leaned 
over backwards’ to help tenants and in the process ‘hadn’t done them any 
favours’. However, the question was particularly at the core of disagreements 
amongst tenants. A flavour of the lack of consensus can be gained from the 
way Tenant 6 expressed this during our interview:28
I was a little bit annoyed on Wednesday night ... was some of them seemed to think 
they were directors of the company and they were the ones who were putting their 
own money into it.  And they were getting a little bit ... um, you know let's not care 
about the tenants ... on the social side of it, as being that it's a social housing 
association ... we're going to be hard as nails and if they don't do this and don't do 
that you know let's get the heavies in and throw them out 10 minutes later, like you 
know.  I felt that from particularly one person.  I don't think I need to say who, I think 
you know.  Mm?  Yes?  …  Yeah yeah. Going on about rent arrears heavily.  Um ... 
yes you've got to keep up on top of rent arrears.  After the meeting I was talking to 
her ... to the person ... you can leave that out there ... and she did apologise to some 
extent and say she didn't mean it like that.  She did mean you know to try and help 
them before they got into arrears.  
A further example concerns the nature of the customer base. On this issue, 
the Chief Executive was clear that the RSL existed for the Wandland 
community, ‘meeting social housing needs in this area’. This wider community 
base to the organisation was also reflected in the view that Wandland needs 
to satisfy hot only current customers but also the future ones. There was 
clearly going to be some discord as the organisation began fulfilling its 
business plan:
And it's just this fascinating realisation that we're going to have upset the majority of 
tenants because there are people, there are small groups of tenants with major needs 
that must be addressed first.  It's just to get it to minimum standards.
Equally, the future customers were in the minds of some board members as 
much as the current.29
5 APPOINTING THE BOARD
The method of appointing the board is the point at which the questions raised 
in our research – concerning the ‘neutral allegiance model’ and ‘expertise –
are raised perhaps at their sharpest. It is at this point that decisions have to 
be made about the most appropriate appointment process both to obtain the 
right people and the right mix. The most common method used to appoint 
tenant board members is through an election process. That raises the 
question of ‘neutral allegiance’ as any successful elected member is faced 
with a difficult dichotomy – are they representatives of those who were able to 
vote or neutral actors/board members? And how is it possible to obtain the 
right mix of skills and expertise both for the successful functioning of the 
board as well as to satisfy the Housing Corporation’s regulatory processes to 
enable the new organization to be registered?
Although similar problems occur with Councillor board members, the issue is 
most stark for tenant board members who, as has been said, are generally 
involved in some form of election process to join the board. Neither the ODPM 
nor the Housing Corporation offer clear guidance in regard to selection 
processes for tenant board members (Audit Commission/Housing 
Corporation, 2004). Despite the fact that both are clear that tenants should not 
play a representative role once on the board, both are also reluctant, it seems, 
to suggest that elections may not be the most appropriate route to board 
membership. Our interviewee from the Housing Corporation’s Registration 
Unit, for example, acknowledged that the Corporation was ‘alert’ to this 
problem, but nonetheless said that the Housing Corporation would not advise 
against elections (Para 79). Moreover, our ODPM interviewee implied that 
some form of ‘democratic validation’ (para 119) was important in the selection 
of tenant members. However, a personal view was that an ‘election isn’t 
necessarily the best way because you don’t necessarily elect the most 
appropriate people in elections’.
There is an interesting distinction here between the ODPM’s policy on LSVTs 
and that on Arms Length Management Organisations (ALMOs). As regards 
the latter, the ODPM advocates a specific policy of election for tenants on 
ALMO board in order to ‘to ensure that they are genuinely representative’ 
(emphasis added) (ODPM, 2004: 12), despite those organisations’ identical 
requirement to defend the ‘corporate interest’ over the tenants’ interest. Our 
ODPM interviewees acknowledged that this was illogical and that issues of 
representativeness and legitimacy figure strongly:
ODPM1: Well it’s…the odd thing is…as you know [ALMO] board members are 
actually all elected, [that is] tenant Board members are elected. So there's this sort of 
perceived, from the tenant perspective, slight sort of schizophrenia about the fact that 
the election process is not automatic with LSVT Board members, is that right?30
ODPM2:  No, it’s not [automatic].
[…]
ODPM1:  And I must admit I think it’s quite difficult slightly to reconcile that, because 
the board membership issues of what a board member is, apply equally to an [ALMO] 
board member as it does to a housing association board member. So that can’t be 
the obstacle or the issue um in itself, so therefore there must be another reason why 
it’s perceived as different, or operates as a different way as the housing associations. 
[…] Because I had a long chat with the ALMO people and I said ‘Was it about 
representativeness i.e. that people have that democratic legitimacy to sit on that 
board?’. And they felt it was integral and important that that happened, but nobody 
was under an illusion that once on the board, this is the theory, they then became 
part of the board. Which of course changes the whole way you do things. (ODPM, 
Para 165-77)
Even if one accepts that some form of ballot is required, there then becomes 
an issue of how best to arrange the process. The question here is whether the 
vote should be on an area basis or for all the tenants irrespective of area. 
Contrast, for example, the views of the LGA (who in any case consider that 
tenant board members should play a representative role) and those of an 
existing RSL struggling to overcome residual issues left by a geographically 
constructed process of tenant election in its early years of existence:
LGA:  And you know equally […] you've got your third tenant reps, you know, they 
must come from a range of different areas (Para 178). […]. Geographically within the 
stock…yeah.  Because if you've got all tenant reps from one estate they will not know 
the issues of the other estates (Para 186).
LSVT Chief Executive:  Um the legacy from tenant involvement is slightly different, 
because the way the transfer was set up, people were effectively voted from an area 
base onto it, and certainly the mindset from day one, and it continues to kind of 
permeate a lot of debate and discussion here, is that we are representing that area at 
the board, and we’re representing tenants from that area at the board. Now a number 
of people who have been elected through that route have made the transition in their 
mindsets through these debates, and actually now see and recognise that their role is 
actually, and responsibility is to the whole organisation. Um but one maybe two still 
think in those terms, and er I think certainly as an important issue for [us] as an 
organisation is out there amongst a big body of tenants, there's still a prevailing view 
that they send a representative to the board to protect their interests (Para 178).
Possible alternative models of appointing tenant board members might be, for 
example, to invite applications from certain people and combine that with an 
interview process (a suggestion from the ODPM interviewee); alternatively, 
persons could be nominated to the Board from tenants’ groups. Both such 
methods, however, are problematic, albeit for different reasons from the ballot 
method. They are problematic because they offer scope either for patronage 
or for choice from a small range of persons who are often not representative 
of the other tenants.
The Wandland Approach31
Wandland’s approach to the appointment of board members was different 
depending on the constituency. Councillors were nominated by each political 
party represented on the council in strict accordance with the usual rules ie a 
proportionate number of seats on the board. The Conservative and Liberal 
democrat parties were allocated two seats on the board each, and the Labour 
party were allocated one seat. As regards independents, the officers 
conducted a skills audit and advertised in local newspapers and websites, as 
well as tailored certain advertising. There was then an interview process. All 
tenants were initially invited to become board members through an 
advertisement in the tenant newspaper. There was then a group meeting after 
which five persons remained who all became board members. Had there 
been more, there would have been a ballot. One board member subsequently 
unfortunately passed away. At this stage, a further advertisement was placed, 
followed by an interview process, which left two candidates. There was then 
an election, which was won by Tenant 6.
As the process for each constituency was different, we consider each 
separately below.
Councillors
The usual process at Wandland Council was for each party to make 
nominations for such positions. Each party calls internally for anybody 
interested in the post and suitable applicants are then nominated, perhaps 
after a vote if more than the allowed number wish to be nominated. Unusually, 
in this particular transfer, Councillor 2, a Conservative, was asked by the 
Liberal Democrat housing committee chair to be nominated. Generally, 
though, it is usually difficult to find volunteers: ‘we’re not awash with 
volunteers’ (Councillor 3, Liberal Democrat); ‘I wouldn’t say I would have been 
knocked down in the rush, to be honest’ (Councillor 4, Labour); 
‘I think in general to get volunteers to do anything for anything they're few and far 
between and usually there's arm twisting to do things … Yeah there was only two 
people really put their name forward.  So obviously once you put your name forward 
and they're filled nobody else ... other people would have done it no doubt.’ 
(Councillor 5, Conservative). 
Amongst the Liberal Democrat group, according to Councillor 1, the Housing 
Committee chair decided that certain people who volunteered for the board 
were not suitable. The chair asked Councillor 3 to become involved:
And therefore [the Chair] wondered whether or not I would be willing to go and seek 
to apply some form of business acumen business viewpoint to counterbalance the 
wonderful caring 'I'm a charity and I love the human race, therefore we'll do 
everything for everyone' … before we go bankrupt.
The general point, however, is that councillors were chosen by political 
appointment as a result of their election success. Councillor 4 accepted the 
appropriateness of this process precisely for that reason:32
its not for me to tell the Tories who they pick, they can pick who they want. They 
might pick someone who just wants to keep (unclear) and keep the price down and 
just keep it out of the way of the tax payer. Er but that’s for them to decide, and I don’t 
see any problem in letting them decide how they want, and I can't see any way other 
than that, anyway.
Even then, though, as Councillor 3 recognised, there was an accountability 
deficit which reflected on this person’s status as a representative for their 
ward:
the people who elected me as councillor have absolutely no knowledge regarding my 
membership for the housing board.  So it's a disconnect between that election and 
[my board membership]
There are three downsides to this political appointment process, however. 
First, there is the recognition that, if the councillor board member is to lose 
their seat at the next relevant local election, most would also expect to leave 
the board:
CLLR1:  I presume that as a councillor I would lose my position on the board.  I 
should think that it is only there because I am a councillor, and that if I lost my place 
then someone else would be put in that position.  (para 236)
CLLR2:  If I lost my seat I would go back to the council before they came to me and 
say ‘I want to stay on that board’. (para 418)
Second, this process raised the question for some Councillor interviewees 
about whether they could unproblematically be both. As councillor 4 put it:
[At] the end of the day I'm there, not because I'm on the Board, I'm there because I'm 
elected by the representatives of Carrick West. That’s why I'm a councillor. I'm not 
even as a Labour councillor or a Coop councillor, I am a, I have a, I am a direct 
representational er link with my electors, in the constitutional side of things that’s, and 
I'm not a Labour councillor. I mean I could stop being a Labour councillor, I could stop 
being a member of the Labour Party tomorrow, I would still be a councillor. Until the 
people in Carrick West determine otherwise. And there is the interesting problem, 
because, okay that’s the first instance. That’s my first role, my first duty. My second 
duty is to my group, my Labour group, the party. Because I am there, again not 
because I'm a representative of Carrick West, but because I'm a member of the 
Labour Party, and the Labour group has chosen me as their representative on that 
Board So I have a, an accountability to them as well (paras 224-6)
We deal with this question further below.
The third point is that, where there is no genuine interest amongst the 
volunteers in the new organisation, or they are interested in one particular 
aspect of it (such as starting it up), the political appointment process can lead 
to apathy and non-attendance. As Independent 1 put it, ‘politicians are 
imposed, rather than being there. I mean they are there because they’ve been 
told to be members if you will.’ This concern was also a ‘known issue’ 
amongst our ky actor interviewees.33
Independents
The concern with independent board members lies in seeking to fill skills gaps 
sufficient to satisfy the Housing Corporation as well as in assisting the 
capacity of the board to ask the right questions when dealing with their 
specific expertise. That being said, it is recognised that 
It is quite hard finding good quality independent board members and ... transfer 
organisations have to put a huge amount of effort into getting good quality 
independent board members who will actually bring the sort of skills and experience 
that they need.  Particularly given that they are voluntary posts.
Wandland, it appears, did have problems recruiting independent board 
members to fill their skills gaps. By the time they came to advertising for the 
posts, they already knew what their skills gaps were and thus were able to 
tailor their process accordingly. However, they still had difficulty filling the 
places:
business people … we had a really good response to those. Um we didn’t have a 
legal person, we didn’t have a financial person, which is a shame, but I think those 
are always the most difficult to engage because they do work long hours I suppose, 
and they do have a big pay packet and they might not want to do it for free. That’s the 
myth anyway, whether that’s true, if you ask an accountant or lawyer, I don’t know. 
Um but at that first stage we had three independents that we took on from that 
interview process. And then we kept advertising, went to different areas, talked to 
different people, um we went to… we wrote to building societies, banks and things 
like that, to try and get our last two remaining sort of, you know, financial and legal 
people. (Officer 5)
I think probably why they selected me, despite my great age, was because of 
(laughs) ... t I suppose the trouble is the younger people don't have the experience.  
Which is probably the only reason.  Cos I personally think that you know you really 
desperately need young people, they don't need geriatrics. … I mean I wouldn't have 
been selected if they'd have had anybody better.  But I don't think, if the truth be 
known, they had many applicants.
During our fieldwork, they had yet to find a suitable person with accountancy 
skills. Independent 2 and 3 actually ‘bumped into’ the role by accident but 
decided to apply.
The interview process involved two tenants and two councillors who 
interviewed twelve or thirteen candidates. Independent 1, whose memory of 
the housing association sector stretched back 35 years to the days of the 
‘gentleman’s club’, described the interview process as similar to that 
experience 35 years previously:
I had a little bit of an interview.  But I mean it wasn't really, I mean it was again a bit 
like it was 35 years ago, you know.
Independent 2 similarly noted that the interview process was not formal:
I was interviewed … And they chatted for about half an hour.  I mean it wasn't a 
particularly formal interview.34
Tenants
The issue for tenants is, of course, similar to councillors, but raised at its most 
stark due to the processes used to select tenant board members. As already 
stated, Wandland used an open advertisement followed by a group meeting 
which would then have been followed by an election process (which was not 
needed). The reason for using an open advertisement was an attempt to 
remove the apparent self-selection of a small group who were prominent 
within the local tenant participation movement. As Officer 4 noted, though, 
that open process did not necessarily produce the desired opening up of
board membership:
there was an advert that went out, well there was an advert, I don’t remember when, 
that went into Open Door, um newsletter to say ‘Are you interested in this position?’ 
So that it wasn't just um the Tenants’ Forum kind of selecting themselves, and saying 
well we’ll put these five people forward, I don’t think they would… they wouldn’t do 
that anyway, because they… they want more tenants to get involved, and they want 
to make that an open process. But I think its important to say that that didn’t happen 
…
Approximately twelve people put their names forward. At that point, the 
council officers made certain checks against those applicants – whether they 
were in rent arrears or there were anti-social behaviour issues or other 
disputes. There were ‘one or two who did, who we had a quiet word to and 
said look if you want to progress this needs to be sorted, and they dropped 
out’. Of the remaining applicants, there was a group meeting, which was 
designed to explain the role of board members. After that meeting, five 
tenants remained interested. Thus, all five filled the places on the board. We 
did not observe the group meeting. Therefore, we cannot make any 
comments on how and why the others ‘deselected’ themselves. Each person 
who expressed an interest was sent a pack of information which also 
contained an application form. That form required them to detail their skills 
and obtain a nomination. According to Officer 5, perhaps the mix of those 
deeply involved in the tenant participation process and those not involved at 
all was responsible for the withdrawals:
I think it might have worried them a bit that they hadn't been involved perhaps before, 
because obviously the tenant representatives have been on different groups, and 
they have known about a lot of this from the start. So perhaps that might have put a 
few people off, I don’t know. But um, yeah we have got one chap on the Board, who 
hasn’t been involved in tenant participation, or the panel, or the forum before so
The process was changed when one of the tenant board members passed 
away. There was, as before, an open advertisement. Respondents were then 
interviewed by a panel made up of the chair of the tenants’ forum, the chair of 
the tenants’ panel, the tenant participation manager, and a councillor board 
member. Four candidates were interviewed and two subsequently went 
forward to a ballot of all the tenants. We did not interview the unsuccessful 
applicants and it was unclear why the other two were not selected for the 
ballot. However, it is of interest that the make-up of the interview panel 35
included strong representation from the current tenant organisations. 
According to Officer 5,the interview panel was looking for persons who had 
broader experience outside of their tenancy, who ‘would be confident to be on 
the board and speak up’. As Tenant 6 put it
you know obviously I gather they haven't picked on them because of the way you 
look, because they picked me.  Um (laughs) you know.  I mean I've got long hair.  I 
mean if I'd have gone in with a bald head like a skinhead and tattoos on me, would 
they have picked me or not?  You know.  But seeing as I've got tattoos and I've got 
long hair and a beard, I would assume they would do.  I don't think that was in their 
criteria
Tenant 6, who was the successful applicant, described the interview process 
as ‘strange’ as he had never before been interviewed for a job:
... it was strange.   I walked in, there were four or five people sat there and ... or sat at 
this table, sort of looking at them and thinking 'God what are they going to ask?' you 
know.  And they asked a few questions.  One guy got on a bit about the disabled, 
because I'm disabled.  And saying 'Oh you know what if we do something ... there's a 
disabled sort of project going, but it gets voted down and another project gets voted in 
its place' I said 'Well providing that project doesn't disadvantage disabled people' I 
said 'it's probably going to be a good project.' … So I really couldn't follow his thing, I 
think he just wanted to make sure I wasn't going to be there shouting the odds for 
disabled people all the time.  I mean I understand quite well, otherwise we wouldn't 
be disabled if we could do everything, you know ...
After the interview process, both candidates wrote 150 words about 
themselves and why they wanted to become a board member. Tenant 6 was 
helped by his wife’s daughter who had experience of working for an RSL. 
Officer 5 may also have adjusted what was written ‘cos it didn’t … wasn’t all 
quite what we wrote’.  What was written did, in fact, become quite 
controversial amongst the then members of the board as it potentially put 
Tenant 6 in conflict with the neutral allegiance model. During our interviews 
with the board members, a number commented that those summaries 
suggested that the applicants would work for tenants, or be the tenants’ 
representative on the board. The conflict was regarded as natural in the sense 
that, unless one offers some sort of representation of tenants’ collective 
interest, a candidate would be unlikely to be successful:
when they had the election they had to put a little bit of blurb about themselves.  I 
think a couple of them said 'Oh I'm going to work for the tenants on the board' and 
such like, which you would.  So most tenants say 'Oh I'll vote for that, he's going to 
work for me.'  But that isn't the intention of the board.  So that's working against itself.  
So obviously with the tenants it is difficult.  You've really got to say 'I'm going to work 
for the tenants' otherwise they won't vote for you. But that isn't why you're there. 
(Councillor 5)
The reality of the situation is that a tenant board member is not representing tenants 
on the board, they’re sitting there as an individual.  And therefore the electioneering, 
the sending out of statements declaring why somebody wants to stand on the board 
have to be geared to how it’s going to benefit tenants.  ‘Vote for me because …’ ‘I’m 
going to ignore you’ won’t get you on the board. (Tenant 3)
The election process itself produced about 2000 votes of which Tenant 6 
obtained approximately 62 per cent.36
6 THE CONSTITUENCY MODEL
In this chapter, we discuss the constituency model. This model requires that 
LSVT RSL boards should have equal membership from three constituencies: 
tenants, councillors, and independents. It is not ‘law’ as such in that it is not a 
formal requirement of the LSVT process. However, the model has come to be 
regarded as a ‘rule’. Our first question, therefore, concerns its derivation and 
purpose – from where did this model appear and why? In answering this 
question, we draw particularly on our key actor interviews, supplemented by 
our study of Wandland HA. We also consider the critiques of the constituency 
model. Our second question is more specific to Wandland. We ask why they 
particularly adopted this model in addition to outlining their views about 
whether it ‘works’ now and will continue to be applicable in the future.
Derivation 
It isn't in itself a regulatory requirement.  The regulatory requirement is that there is 
independent board members, or that the board is independent, so no single 
constituency group has overall control.  Which is one of the reasons why you have 
this model of a third, a third, a third. But there's no specific reason why it should be in 
that proportion, other than that it has come to be if you like a logical conclusion of 
how you maintain our regulatory requirement which is there's an independence of the 
board. (Housing Corporation Interview)
Most LSVT RSLs operate some version of the constituency model but this is 
not a formal requirement. Why? The formal requirement is that LSVT RSLs 
must be ‘independent and free standing’ (ODPM, 2004: para 12.16) so that 
they do not fall within the category ‘public sector’ for Treasury purposes. 
Formally, the 1989 Local Government Act stipulated that any organization, 
including RSLs, with more than twenty per cent local authority persons 
represented in its governing body was deemed to be under council control 
and therefore subject to treasury-imposed borrowing constraints. The 1996 
Housing Act however allowed up to 49 percent of a housing association board 
to comprise council nominees, and likewise up to 49 percent to comprise 
tenants so long as one third comprised ‘independents’ (Malpass and Mullins, 
2002: 679). Nevin (1999: 4) argues that this change was specifically 
motivated by the need to counter criticism about the loss of the local authority 
influence which had been aimed at early transfer associations.
The origins of this constituency model are relatively vague. What seems clear 
is that the model reflects a pragmatic compromise at some stage between 
different interests – the council, who are selling their stock and, perhaps, need 
to be persuaded that they will retain some degree of control; the occupiers, 37
who must vote for the transfer and need to be persuaded to vote in favour; the 
prospective lenders, who need to be assured the appropriate governance and 
management structures are in place. 
Our ODPM interviewee described it in terms of a policy drift, rather than in 
instrumental terms. The model was something ‘came to pass rather than any 
sort of deep and meaningful thoughts that the third/third/third sort of came into 
place’. It ‘evolved I think as a response to a number of issues and there was 
no one driver for it, but there was a belief that um that it was a good thing’. 
Once it passed into practice, however, it became practice and ‘if it’s not 
broken don’t try and fix it’.
In the early days of stock transfer the model tended to reflect more closely 
that used in the rest of the RSL sector, comprising mainly independents with 
one or two council and tenant representatives. In predominantly rural or 
suburban largely Conservative-controlled authorities where relatively good 
quality stock resulted in the generation of positive capital receipts, there was 
no need for additional economic or political incentives. Mullins and Malpass 
(2002: 678) argue, however, that by the mid 1990s extra incentives were 
required to maintain the momentum of the transfer programme and to 
overcome political and economic obstacles. Mullins and Malpass (2002) 
argue that the mid-1990s saw ‘a good deal of effort’ expended in the search 
for new models to overcome those obstacles (for example, where there was a 
negative valuation of the stock or the council was unwilling/concerned about 
LSVT). 
The Hancock inquiry (NFHA, 1995a, 1995b) into RSL governance considered 
five possible governance models but did not recommend any one model in 
particular despite ‘considerable support for a constituency-based system’ 
(Kearns, 1996: 62). At the time, the NFHA (now the NHF) argued strongly in 
favour of a constituency model because LSVT RSLs have defined (groups of) 
important stakeholders to be represented in the constitutional balance of the 
board and to whom the organisation is accountable (NFHA, 1995b). However, 
unlike TPAS, which supported a mandatory constituency model to the 
Hancock inquiry (Kearns, 1996: 62), the NFHA stopped short of such a 
recommendation. They expressed a concern that this mechanism ‘should not 
be a substitute for wider accountability and responsive mechanisms’ and also 
that ‘it should not be structured to institutionalize a fragmented board of 
interest group representatives’ (NFHA, 1995b: 59). Zitron (1995) also argued 
for the constituency model by reference to the discussion at that time 
concerning ‘local housing companies’. That model sought to maintain local 
accountability by establishing constitutional arrangements which allowed 
councillors to retain an element of control in the organisation receiving the 
stock.
In order to make the transfer to non-public sector organisations palatable and 
acceptable to the more well-organised and active tenants, there was an 
element of pragmatism and compromise. As it became clear that there could 
be significant and organised opposition to transfer it became crucial for the 
process to encompass ‘incentives’ and ‘guarantees’ for tenants (just as it had 38
local authorities) in order to obtain the critical majority support which had been 
made a requirement of the process (Malpass, 2005: 191). Our key actor and 
Wandland interviewees recognised this element of pragmatic compromise:
the third third third model is politically sensible to deal with oppositional councils, 
oppositional tenants and if you like some idea of independence. (CML)
in terms of selling the proposition of transfer, a third-third-third, is probably the only 
thing that satisfies the political interest and those of tenants. (Chief Executive, LSVT)
Tenant participation, both generally and on governing boards, became a 
means of legitimating the transfer alternative to state provision in housing.  
Our TPAS interviewee was clear that the constituency model was a ‘selling’ 
and ‘negotiating’ point for transfer. Indeed, the case would have been weaker 
if tenant places were not offered. Furthermore, the offer was combined with 
the ability to elect representatives to the board of governors, which formed 
‘part of the sales pitch to local residents’.  As such, once strong tenant 
activists had successfully ‘demanded’ seats on boards in early transfers, 
others followed (TPAS Interview, 2005).
This reason was understood by a number of our Wandland board member 
and officer interviewees. For example Tenant 3 recognised that the 
constituency model was designed to secure a successful vote in favour of 
transfer:
are tenant board members there just to get transfer? … which is an interesting 
concept.  As I say … one could say that the whole process is a bit set up to ensure 
the balance is positive.  And I think if there wasn’t tenant board members you’d have 
a much harder job in the transfer process in actually getting the Yes vote. So from 
that point of view if the councillors weren’t there the council would never vote it 
through either.  So the model as it is is a model to enable transfer.
Malpass (1997) has suggested that there is a ‘public acceptability’ of having 
tenant board members, noting the importance of appearing legitimate. 
However, Pawson and Fancy (2003, 30) have argued that although the view 
exists 
‘… that Government’s post-1996 enthusiasm for the…[constituency] model [was] a 
“concession” to encourage acceptance of the transfer option among both Councillors 
and tenants’, the model is nonetheless important “in symbolic terms” even if any clear 
policy direction associated with these particular constituencies is difficult to identity’.  
The Audit Commission makes clear that it does not ‘require’ RSLs to include 
residents on boards but notes that some RSLs found that their inclusion had 
‘a positive effect’ - in terms of their ‘relationship with the wider tenant body: 
credibility is added’ (Audit Commission/Housing Corporation, 2004: 23). 
However, they also argued (at p 43) that the ‘business case’ for involving 
residents in governance structures was far from clear. Therefore, the need to 
enhance credibility may go some way to explain why the inclusion of tenants
on boards of LSVT associations, which require tenant consent, is virtually 
mandatory whilst not otherwise being a formal requirement nor even de 
rigueur in other non-transfer RSLs.39
Less cynically, it might also be argued that the model, or at least its promotion 
after 1997, did indeed contain elements of a chosen policy direction. The 
government was concerned to be acting in the interests of tenants rather than 
just concerned to be giving that impression. The widespread adoption of the 
constituency model appears to have coincided with the New Labour public 
services reform agenda. This continued the previous Conservative 
government’s policy of removing direct local representative control, which it 
characterised as unresponsive and paternalistic. The traditional 
representative model of council control was deemed less legitimate than more 
participatory forms of democracy coupled with a regulatory and centrally-
dictated framework. Thus, the formal promulgation of tenant participation 
compacts by the New Labour government (DETR, 1999), almost as one of 
their first policy acts in housing, continued and formalised the previous 
government’s agenda, whilst maintaining a more open-ended policy of 
‘steering, nor rowing’.
Purpose
Even though the model may have arisen as a pragmatic compromise, it 
nevertheless has further purposes beyond the purely instrumental purpose of 
securing the vote. Here, we draw on our literature review, interviews with key 
actors and case study data to flesh out these other purposes. We take each 
constituency in turn and consider the benefits of each. Underlying those 
benefits are broader and diverse issues of accountability. In each, 
expressions of accountability are used differently but, ultimately, that is the 
concern.
Tenants: Consumers and Stakeholders
Whilst one might be cynical about the rationale for tenant board membership, 
there is an inherent value in their involvement at board level, as well as 
reflecting the values of the organisation itself. Broadly, such a justification falls 
within an understanding of tenant board members as consumers of, or 
stakeholders in, the delivery of the housing service. 
The adoption of the constituency model coincided with New Labour’s 
advocacy of ideas associated with stakeholder capitalism and the model’s 
continued promotion is likely to owe something to stakeholding principles. It 
was presented as an appealing alternative to counter the damaging effects of 
unfettered markets, especially in terms of social cohesion. Levitas (2005: 50) 
describes stakeholding as ‘an attempt to address obvious economic and 
social problems’. She argues that it sought to offer an alternative form of 
capitalism which ‘condemns some of the effects of the free market, but seeks 
to accommodate or resolve differences of interest between shareholders, 
directors, workers, customers and the wider community, without recourse to 
public ownership and with varying amounts of regulation’ (id). In the context of 
LSVT RSLs, stakeholder input may help to ensure that the organisation 40
considers the needs and desires of its key stakeholders and to retain direct 
lines of accountability where previous democratic mechanisms have been 
replaced. 
This notion of stakeholder is expressed through, for example, employee 
directors and, indeed, tenant board members of LSVT RSLs. The primary 
benefit, then, is to provide a form of democratic accountability, albeit imperfect 
but which is more complete than the ‘usual’ tenant participation structures. As 
our Housing Corporation interviewee put it,
And allowing tenants to have a stake that arguably they've never actually had, even 
though they've had the democratic accountability before.  …  Arguably they may well 
be better placed to make those judgements than perhaps some others who don't 
have to live on the estates, that get transferred
Councillor 4 similarly expressed this view as well:
It was because as a principle, ‘cause I'm a cooperative councillor, I like the idea of 
tenants actually having a voice, a controlling, not a controlling voice but a major 
voice, in their own houses, as opposed to just being (unclear) you know, things are 
done to them by the council. Admittedly they have their tenants Boards but they can 
be very hit and miss affairs. But one of the reasons why I like about this thing is that 
the actual tenants are involved in the decision-making. There is accountability from 
them, through them, back to the tenants. And for the first time ever you’ve actually got 
tenants really having a vote on the Board Which they don’t get, it’s all done by others 
for them.
Tenant 3, for example, specifically became involved in the organisation in 
order to ensure that the board had a balance between different tenant 
stakeholders. Tenant 3 noted that most tenant participation had centred 
around the urban areas in Wandland and, perhaps as a result, those areas 
had been most successful in obtaining resources of one kind or another. The 
more rural parts of Wandland were, thus, viewed as being the poor relation:
I am determined that those areas will not see the level of preferential treatment 
they’ve had in the past because of that.  You know to my mind it has to go across the 
tenant base, not to isolated pockets of interest.  So yes I’m there to ensure there’s fair 
play but I’m also there sometimes to give a counterargument.  For example the 
secure front door programme has been going a few years and the tenants, the 
involved tenants at that time, said that they wanted the high crime areas fitted with 
them first … which rather suited their location.  However, there’s evidence showing … 
and we’re feeling it here from Bochester … that if you screw down the lid in the high 
crime areas the crime just moves out a bit.
From the individualist consumerist perspective the role of the tenant board 
member could be simply to provide user insight at board level. Indeed the 
Audit Commission report suggests that ‘many associations value a user 
perspective at board level’ (Audit Commission/Housing Corporation, 2004: 
23). Our Housing Corporation interviewee added that  ‘part of the benefit of 
having tenants [on boards] is that it brings a consumer perspective…which is 
incredibly important to boards’. User presence on the board of governors is 
designed to ensure these service requirements are fed through to 
management (Ashby, 2004: 55).41
Our key actor and case study data supports this understanding of the purpose 
of having tenant board members, a purpose which was valued particularly by 
the other constituencies. Thus, for example, Councillor 3 talked of the 
‘continual reminders’ offered by tenant board members. Independent 2 made 
the point that tenant board members 
remind the board reasonably often that you know what the company’s here for. And 
the company’s here to provide housing. And sometimes you take your eye off the ball 
and think well it’s here just for some other …
It was precisely because of that everyday experience that tenants obtained 
their expertise (see below, Chapter 8). Tenant 6 argued this point particularly, 
suggesting that added to the credibility of their voice on the board:
And in a way I think perhaps they ought to listen as much if not a little bit more to the 
tenant board members, because we actually live in the properties.  So we know what 
is going on at the ground level as well as being in the board.  Independents, they 
might live in their own private houses, but they won't feel the effects if there's a fault 
in the company, something wrong along the line, like the tenants will feel that effect. 
You know I mean if the maintenance on the properties falls behind ... you know
private house tenants aren't going to notice it.  You know they're not going to notice it, 
cos their houses, they pay for it themselves and they do it, but they're on the board.  
But as a tenant board member if the property starts falling into decay and it's not 
being done, what's got to be done by them, you know what is the company's side of 
it, like exterior decorating and maintenance of communal areas, and that falls behind 
... well as a tenant board member I'm going to feel that.  I mean if you work for a car 
company and you drive a different car company's car you're not going to feel the 
faults that the car company you work for's car's got.  Because you don't drive their 
car.
If tenant board members are conceived merely in such terms, however, it 
undermines the equality of their role vis-à-vis the other board members. 
Indeed, our TPAS interviewee suggested that some tenants are perceiving 
that they are seen as second class directors by their colleagues who do not 
consider an awareness of the tenant perspective to warrant sufficient 
expertise to claim a place on the board. Instead, our interviewee argued 
tenants must have expertise beyond the user perspective. Likewise our 
ODPM interviewees indicated that there was a need to be careful not to 
‘pigeon-hole’ or ‘patronise’ tenant members as having no broader role than in 
consumerist terms. 
Our observations of board meetings and policy groups suggested that, when 
on-the-ground service delivery issues were discussed, tenant board members 
were particularly prominent in discussions. Further, there was an evident 
frustration on the part of the independent members about the degree to which 
operational matters were over-discussed at board meetings where there was 
a crowded agenda. This was not projected strongly (very rarely did 
independent members make the point that things should not be discussed at 
the meetings); rather, this was evidenced in their mannerisms and asides at 
meetings, in eye contact or whispers etc (including actively seeking out the 
observer with raised eyebrows or smirks).42
From the consumer accountability perspective it is hard to see how tenant 
board members will somehow be able to personify the average tenant 
perspective. In reality all any one tenant will be able to do is portray their own 
individual user insight. This is hardly empowering (even in consumerist terms) 
for the very many who are not given this privileged route to management. As 
ODPM guidance (2004) notes, 
‘It should not be assumed that tenant board members will necessarily represent the 
wider range of tenants views or that tenant board members are solely responsible for 
tenant issues.’
Those tenants most likely to be involved in such high level ‘participation’ are 
likely to be richer in human capital than many of their fellow tenants 
(Riseborough, 1998; Goodlad, 2001; Cheung & Yip, 2003; Cairncross et al, 
1994). In short, the degree to which the consumers chosen to provide the 
consumer perspective will be representative of consumers more generally is 
open to some considerable question. As such, the value they can bring from a 
service improvement perspective in terms of output accountability may be 
accordingly limited. 
Councillors: Accountability, Strategy, Ethos
Temple (2000: 321) argued that local government control of public sector 
housing, however flawed and weak did provide some degree of democratic 
legitimacy and could potentially ensure that the driving force of public services 
was in the public interest. Zitron (2004), on the other hand, questioned 
whether the local authority model actually enabled any meaningful 
accountability to tenants. Indeed, Zitron suggested that LSVT would restore ‘a 
degree of democratic accountability that no longer applies to local authorities’. 
Tenure shifts meant that the political relationship between local authorities 
and their tenants no longer existed since only in a small minority of cases can 
they influence voting results in individual wards. Thus, tenants are now unable 
to ‘control their homes through controlling their council’ (with only 12 per cent
of wards in 2001 having more than 25 per cent of households in council 
housing). Thus, the primary motivation for transfer should be a democratic 
rather than a service management or funding one: ‘[C]oncentrated resident 
power and influence in well-designed housing association governance 
structures is now potentially a far stronger instrument than diluted electoral 
influence [over councils]’.
Our data suggested three particular purposes for Councillor involvement at 
the level of board membership: initial oversight of the transaction; the 
continuing relationship between the new RSL and the council; the retention of 
the ethical sense of the ‘social’.
As regards the first purpose – initial oversight of the transaction – our key 
actor and Wandland data both suggested that this was a relevant purpose. It 
was regarded as appropriate the councillors retained some ‘inside track’ to 43
ensure that their properties were not being sold to an organisation ‘made of 
straw’:
during this stage, the handover stage I feel it is important for the council to feel that 
councillors, they're not handing over they're business to something which doesn’t 
have any view or understanding of council business. (Independent 3)
I think it's important because … it's the deal that's on the table.  And it's ... you know 
the council has to make it financially stack up.  So it's quite important that councillors 
are involved. (LGA Interviewee)
I think it is for the council, they want to have, this is about a lot, you know their 
properties um moving over to Housing Association and they want to have some kind 
of control, still in some interests there. so I think its very important for the council. And 
also to have a view as to see how things are, you know how the process is moving, I 
think they want to have those people in right at the heart of the decision making 
process. Um and its, you know it can also be something that effects an awful lot of 
their constituents. I mean you get really big stock transfers of 20,000 people, that’s a 
lot of constituents for a councillor. They have a vested interest in making sure that 
things work properly, that they are there at the heart of decision making I think, the 
more important aspect. (NHF Interviewee)
I think they act as a line of communication definitely, I mean I think there is that, um 
that they have a knowledge of what's going on within the council, they have a 
knowledge of what's, should be what's going on in the community. And I think at the 
initial stage of transition between it being local authority stock to housing association 
stock its useful to have, um its useful to have that. (NHF Interviewee)
For some, like Independent 3 and the NHF interviewee, this initial purpose of 
Councillor board members would, after a short period, be redundant and there 
would be no further purpose for Councillors on the board. However, for others, 
it was recognised that there was a continuing relationship between an LSVT 
RSL and the council which produce a continuing purpose for councillors as 
board members:
we have a strategic, still retain a strategic, we have a strategic role. In delivering 
housing for our residents. And because of that I think we need to be able to, we can't 
just treat it as a, and there is, there is an absolute relationship between them, and 
there were our houses. And I think that as a result, it’s not just another housing 
association. There is a link that flows through from the local authority through the 
houses to the new Board
The LGA interviewee similarly expressed this continuing role for councillors 
using the language of accountability and giving the specific example of 
nomination rights:
[Boards] have to be accountable.  And so they have to be accountable to the council, 
because it's a deal they've done with the council.  So the councillors on the board will 
help that accountability and actually look through what's happening and say okay you 
know what's happening with nomination rights here, what's happening with you know 
refurbishment there.  And actually help maintain that deal and that sort of like contract 
that the RSL has done with the council.  So that I believe is [] the most fundamentally 
important thing that the councillors on that board will do at that moment in time. (LGA 
Interviewee)44
The CML representative suggested that there were potential ongoing financial 
benefits of a continuing relationship:
I mean the relationship between a local authority and a housing association can be 
productive.  I mean not least in terms of some of the issues around for example when 
you sell … many of these are under what are called sharing agreements between the 
LA and the HA.  When you sell a property under the right to buy half the receipt 
rebates back to a local authority. … Now in your relationship with a local authority 
your hope might be that if you have a positive relationship, if that does rebate back to 
the local authority, they will create a pool of funds that they ultimately finance the HA 
to do things with.  Now that’s down to a positive relationship with the local authority.  
So that relationship between the local authority and the housing association can be 
creative and the councillors are part of that.
Finally, there was a suggestion in our data that Councillor board members 
could offer an assurance that the new organisation would take on ‘social 
values’. Councillor 3 expressed this:
I think in the transfer process and the setting out and the establishment of housing 
authority I believe that there needs to be some agency or other that is actually 
maintaining the values that social housing had when they were a local authority issue 
... um, maintains or enhances the standard.  And ensures that the housing body is 
run according to the social values which it espouses, rather than run on a commercial 
landlord base.
Independents: Reassurance, Skills and Expertise
The inclusion of independent members by contrast is designed to offer 
reassurance to lenders and regulators that their investment is safe and will be 
appropriately managed. The modern reliance of RSLs on mixed funding 
structures requires effective accountability mechanisms to the guardians and 
distributors of those funds, in this case the state through the Housing 
Corporation, and lenders themselves. As Collier (2004: 930) notes
‘The initial funds, and much continuing funding is public funding, either in the form of 
grants for new social housing, or in the large proportion of social rents that are funded 
by social security benefits. Consequently (direct and indirect) public funding results in 
a high level of regulatory and inspection activity’.
Our key actor interviewees were skeptical about the involvement of either 
tenants or councillors or both, but all recognised that the independent 
constituency was the sine qua non of transfer. They were said to be the 
‘sacrosanct bit of the third/third/third’ (ODPM Interviewee). They have a 
distinct role in providing neutrality (Housing Corporation Interview). Others 
referred to the importance of independent board members in terms of te 
balance they offer to the interests of the other constituencies:
Well I think their role […] is to have a kind of overview, to act independently and to 
have an overview of ... you know without coming from one particular viewpoint.  Now 
tenants are obviously going to come from a tenant viewpoint. […]. Councillors are 
obviously going to come from a council's viewpoint ... no matter what the Corporation 
says.  You know but the independent members are there to be independent, to you 
know not have a vested interest (LGA, Para 166-170).45
So you have the tenants that have their own agenda, and councillors that have their 
own agendas as well, and really in order to serve best an organisation such as [ours], 
I think the only sensible thing is to draw as many people with experience of 
commerce, if you like, onto the board to make sure that the company is run well. 
(LSVT RSL Key Actor, Para 173).
Going beyond this general endorsement for the comfort they offered, in 
particular, independents also offer specific skills and expertise which, 
otherwise, the board may be lacking. Particular skills include legal and 
financial. The CML interviewee made this point strongly:
when you think what are you getting from the local authority, you really are getting 
housing management … broadly.  So that’s what’s coming across to you.  You know 
they’ve not … they’ve relied internally on HR, finance, planning.  All of those things 
are being left behind.  So to some extent you’ve got to replicate that in the board, 
going forward.
Our lender interviewee made clear that governance structures and skills gaps 
were particularly important to them (although did not make the point made by 
the CML representative). For this organisation, one interviewee said ‘It will not 
stop us lending, but it would be a comfort to know there is a balance [of skills 
on the board].’ They noted that most LSVT RSLs went into some form of 
supervision or administration because of poor governance and not poor 
performance. More generally, as Independent 2 put it:
.  I mean um ... and the independents I think because they'd been recruited for their 
skills and for their job roles um ... well to a certain extent I mean it cements the thing 
together a little bit.  Otherwise I think there would be ... I don't think there would be 
enough professional input into it.  And we would be relying too much on advisors and 
consultants really.
Wigglesworth and Kendall (2000) argue that ‘the changing nature of the RSL 
financial environment has increased the perceived importance of business 
acumen, leading to the recruitment of more volunteer board members 
positioned to advise of funding and accounting’. They consider this change to 
be a mixed blessing for, although the recruitment of independent members 
with financial and accounting expertise may enhance accountability to both 
funders and the regulatory body, their presence (particularly if they come to 
dominate) may threaten the social credibility and social orientation of RSLs (at 
pp 10-11). In Wandland, board members, by contrast, particularly valued 
these business and other skills which independents brought with them:
They bring a set of competencies so that ... they bring with them one magical thing of 
'I want to contribute', so you know this great sort of well of goodness.  In addition to 
that they individually bring different competencies.  We had (inaudible) 'Well we 
should be looking for the right person' and I'll say 'No no no no, we need to balance 
the competencies, there are a whole set that we need and there are some we haven't 
got.  I think we're short on legal.'  But Independent 2, bless him, not only does he 
bring a lovely lovely person[ality], but he also brings a massive accountancy.  And 
that's fine cos I can deal with the business but this is the guy who can actually dot the 
Is and cross the Ts and work out where I've left bloody great big holes.  … 
Independent 3 brings (pause) a wonderful array of organisation, logic ... almost 
project management talent into the picture.  Independent 4 ... predominantly brings 
the ability to manage the board ... yeah, pretty effectively. (Councillor 3)46
Independent members, according to our lender organisation, offer comfort 
through their externality – they are not subject to the pressures of tenant and 
councillor board members. They also have expertise which is important in 
complex commercial organisations:
The independent members play a very important role as the expertise and private 
sector experience they bring to boards usually reinforce the view that the RSL has the 
ability to perform well and make hard decisions.
Independent board members can provide funders with comfort because they will be 
viewing the RSL from the outside and therefore with a level of impartiality. Depending 
on what their professional background is, this may provide further comfort to a funder.
Critiques of the Constituency Model
In addition to the discussion below about the conflicts faced by board 
members as a result of the neutral allegiance model of governance, our key 
actor interviews disclosed a number of concerns about the constituency
model. As befits a working model born out of compromise and pragmatism, no 
particular interest group is entirely happy with it. The following is a summary 
of the critiques.
Tenant board members and tenant participation
The principal concern of TPAS was that tenant involvement at board level can 
lead to a leveling off of more general tenant participation activity. As our 
interviewee suggested:
There is a discontinuity between tenant engagement and tenants on boards. It is 
assumed that having tenants on the board means that the LSVT is getting the tenant 
perspective. Tenants on boards is not the same thing as tenant participation.
This concern was (interestingly) mirrored by our lender organization because 
of what it symbolizes to the lender: 
Tenant involvement and consultation is important at board level but even more critical 
on the ground. An RSL that has active tenant involvement is usually performing well.
For the CIH representative, having tenants as board members can be 
tokenistic. Further, it can lead to the RSL assuming that ‘tenants on board 
means [that they] know what tenants think and want’.
Recruitment and Retention
Concerns exist about the recruitment and retention of certain board members, 
particularly councillors and independents. The CML representative said47
I mean many authorities find it difficult to recruit councillors to serve and certainly the 
attendance record of those councillors that have been appointed often diminishes 
very rapidly.  And so what you often end up with is one or two councillors who stick 
with it and large numbers fall by the wayside.  So if nothing else you’re faced with a 
constant turnover of the councillors, which actually again undermines the capacity of 
that board to operate effectively. And then you have independents.  And I mean 
depending where the independents … where the LSVT is, the quality of the 
independents varies enormously.
Recruitment and retention issues are particularly prominent after the LSVT 
RSL has been in place for some time. Attendance particularly by Councillors 
falls off, partly because they simply cannot meet the commitments required of 
the organization (LSVT RSL interviewee) or cannot find the time, for example, 
even to read the board papers (ODPM interviewee). For one LSVT RSL 
interviewees, an amicable arrangement grew up over time as the council 
forewent its ‘seats’ on the board:
in terms of selling the proposition of transfer, a third/third/third or the kind of variation 
on that, is probably the only thing that satisfies the political interest and those of 
tenants of transfer, … and finding that down the line, particularly after the five year 
transfer kind of promise period had passed, um that there were some fundamental 
flaws in the constituency model of governance, which weren't serving the future of the 
business very well. So that here precipitated a conversation as part as our wider 
review of corporate governance, that said well maybe the district would take a 
different view about that now, they work with lots of other different associations, they 
don’t have members on their Boards, [our organisation] honours its promises, lets 
have the debate with them about changing the nature of our relationship, because the 
relationship was getting better, er they were amenable to that, and fairly recently 
agreed as I've already implied to kind of reduce the number from three to one, and 
we just voted on that with our share holders um two weeks ago, to actually approval 
to make a rule change. And the council have put a marker down that in another year 
or two they may be willing to forgo their final place.
Although councillor attendance might be anticipated to fall off over time, our 
observations of Wandland meetings noted that, in fact, councillor attendance 
was already at a low ebb. Low attendance levels were causing other board 
members to question the role of councillors on the board. Indeed, councillors 
only seemed to attend at the ‘defining moments’. As was noted during one 
observation of a board meeting:
The cynical might notice that this is the only time that any Councillors volunteer to 
propose/second throughout the whole three hour meeting and might think that they 
just want their names associated with the crucial moment. Usually it is tenants and, 
less regularly, independents who propose and second things.
Quality Issues
A concern mentioned by a number of interviewees concerned ensuring that 
board members exhibited the right qualities and experience. The ODPM 
representative noted this concern particularly in relation to councillors who are
not chosen as such, but nominated, as opposed to other groups:
either they believe that its they're there as councillors, which is a bloody nuisance, or 
they're not there at all because they can’t be bothered to turn up, or you'll get ones 48
who are really good. But in a way, they are the, perhaps the most unpredictable bit. 
Because you will go through a selection process for your independents, and you can 
vet them, in a way. And in a way, there is an assumption that the tenant Board 
members, however they have been selected will be effective because in a way, to 
have got to that point they’ve demonstrated their effectiveness as members of a 
community where they have risen to the point at which they will be naturally selected, 
be it through interview or whatever.
Our Wandland data certainly discloses some degree of opposition to 
continuing councillor involvement at board member level. Partly, this was 
against particular individuals who were negatively regarded (because they 
were unable to leave their politics at the door, were non-attenders, or simply 
lacked the essential competence or commitment):
The local authority, um I mean they are a major stakeholder, and ... specially in the 
early days when we're trying to um ... I can understand why they should be on.  But 
um ... in many ways they probably contribute ... probably a bit less than I'd hoped 
really. (Independent 2)
Ten2:I think councillors who serve on a Board have to remember that what they're 
doing is non political, and some councillors are very political, and I'm not just talking 
here but some councillors are very political. And that can sometimes make things 
difficult, because of their political views, you know their…
I:  Has that happened here?
Ten2:  Um, (pause) no comment.
I:  (laughs)
Ten2:  Lets just say that we did have one councillor who wasn’t too sure about 
whether he could marry the two together. (Tenant 2)
But councillors can do that as well mind you, they can be not up to speed and they 
can get looks from the independents saying ‘You don’t understand what …’  Now to 
be honest, councillors don’t understand transfer.  They haven’t really had the time or 
the inclination to understand what it’s all about.  Specially the financial part of it.  So 
even at board meetings now we’re getting councillors asking very fundamental 
questions about the capital receipt and about the valuation and everything else.  And 
about you know right to buy sales post transfer and things like that, which really they 
should know. (Tenant 3)
Others expressed concerns about the quality of tenant board members. It was 
regularly said to us that the point was not just to have tenant board members, 
but to have good ones. After all, as was said to us more than once, the most 
likely reason for going into supervision lay in poor governance. Ongoing 
debates within TPAS suggest both ambivalence towards the constituency 
model, but also concern that the most appropriate tenants become board 
members as this reflected on the organization, other tenants and financial 
viability:
TPAS basically believes that having 1/3 tenants on the board is a good thing, but its 
support is not such an unqualified 'yes' as 3 or 4 yrs ago. Recognise now that what is 
needed is to have capable trained tenants, but not tokenism. It is in tenants interest
that that boards operate effectively, tenants suffer if governance not operating well 
because RSL will be put into supervision, poor services etc. Not any tenant on the 
board will do. TPAS believes that tenants can and do operate well this role, but good 49
tenants on board = better landlord, but bad tenant on board not good for tenants. This 
is subject to ongoing debate in TPAS.
Our lender organization similarly made the point that tenants on the board 
need to be able to contribute and raised questions about their 
appropriateness when complex issues were being considered by the board.
The issue is how are they going to contribute commercially to decision-making? Do 
they need 5 reps? Would it be better to have tenants forum with one or two reporting 
back?
Tenants can be good to have on the Board as it hopefully will lead the Board to 
consider the most 'grass roots' of issues. Tenant board members can therefore 
effectively be the 'vocal chords' of their community. However, when they are being 
relied upon to decide/vote/give opinion on complex issues eg treasury 
management/products, their potential lack of knowledge/expertise, can lead to a 
wasted vote/opinion due to lack of understanding.
Balance
At the level of policy, it was said, by both the Housing Corporation and ODPM 
interviewees, that it was the independent constituency which was perhaps the 
most important. They provided balance on the board, and mediated between 
the interests of board members – indeed, the Housing Corporation 
interviewee suggested that was a particular reason why independents might 
relish the role, as they had real power in the new organization. However, 
equally, whilst tenant and councillor board members might be dispensable, 
independent board members were a sine qua non. As the ODPM interviewee 
put it:
there is a sacrosanct bit, and its never expressed in that way, it is, it is the 
independent’s role. And the corporation puts great weight on their involvement, as do 
we in the department. … they are the ones who could be bringing the wind of change, 
you could argue, that a transfer is meant to be delivering, along with tenant 
involvement.
Working Relationships
One of the important uncertainties with an LSVT RSL is its lack of history. 
This impacts on what it must show to lenders in order to obtain funding. 
However, its lack of history also creates uncertainty at the level of 
governance. Put simply
And do the Board actually you know, knit together? Because a personality is a 
personality, and you can find you will get dysfunctional Boards, and I talked to the 
corporation about this about you know, when they're looking at Boards, shadow 
Boards that have been established that they're unhappy about them, and what you 
can do to try and change that, because then, because they don’t come together 
naturally. Um and just because everyone has been through a selection process, it 
doesn’t naturally mean that they are all right together, um initially. (ODPM)50
The interactive nature of boards, and the importance of personality, therefore 
impacts on the governance structures of the organization; more so, when 
there is some antipathy between board members to the extent that the real 
business of the board becomes shrouded by animosity.
Embedding the constituency model: The case of Wandland
Given that the constituency model is not a formal requirement and there are 
criticisms of its appropriateness (which are well-known amongst the housing 
‘community), why then did Wandland adopt it? Officers remembered that 
board member composition had been discussed. Our interviews with officers 
together with other data from our key actors suggested that the constituency 
model is usually adopted because it has become the norm. indeed, deviation 
from the norm in a highly charged environment can be negative:
And I think the third model has become enshrined in the process, which means that 
now if I went to the transfer and opted to do for the sake of argument half/half as it 
were, with half independence, Defend Council Housing and all the rest would be 
down there like a rat exposing that, and individual tenants would be made nervous by 
it. (CML Interviewee)
Officers discussed whether the board should be comprised of 12 or 15 
members with the Housing Corporation (as board membership has tended to 
become slimmer over time amongst RSLs generally), and were advised that 
the Corporation preferred odd numbers for voting purposes (Officer 1). 
However, what appears to have been significant was the involvement of the 
consultants who clearly favoured the constituency model:
there was discussions about whether we should do something different than a 5-5-5, I 
mean ? was put to us by the consultants as very much what normally happens, and 
there was some discussions about whether we should have larger tenant 
involvement, um… smaller council involvement (laughs). Um but in the end… (Officer 
1)
And it’s the kind of thing that you kind of think it, but because there are so many 
consultants involved, and they… they say oh no, no this is the way that its done, it 
kind if… you know its already happened and you haven't really had much time to 
influence it or you know, I wouldn’t say that the cons- the consultants involved in 
transfer are very TP minded,
…
And I think it was decided in the… in the working group, but it was very much 
influenced by the consultants who said this is the model … (Officer 4)
Conclusions
Malpass (1997: 50; 2005), argues that board membership by tenants (as well 
as councillors and independents) portrays a strong message that RSLs are 
types of organisations in which accountability to tenants, the public at large, 
and financiers are each valued. Further, by reserving places on boards for 
tenants and councillors, LSVT RSLs have adopted an approach which is 51
(ostensibly) more democratic and accountable than that in the traditional 
housing association sector. The Audit commission itself claims that the model 
has brought successes in accountability terms (Audit Commission/Housing 
Corporation, 2004: 3).
Nevertheless, the constituency model has developed more as a result of 
serendipity than science as a pragmatic response to the needs of different 
‘players’ in the transfer process. Despite this, our data suggests that there are 
continuing benefits of each constituency, although there are trenchant 
critiques of the model. Indeed, the constituency about which most complaint 
was made was the councillor board members.52
7 THE ‘NEUTRAL ALLEGIANCE 
MODEL’
Introduction
In the two previous chapters, we have considered the way board members 
are appointed and the constituency model usually adopted by LSVT RSLs 
(under which board membership is taken equally from tenants, councillors and 
independents). Although these are conceptually separate issues in their own 
right, both have a bearing on the issue discussed in this chapter – what we 
have termed the neutral allegiance model. Under this model, board members 
must act in the interests of the organisation – the ‘corporate interest’ – and not 
on behalf of other interests. The neutral allegiance model poses issues for two 
particular constituencies – tenants and councillors – who may be regarded 
(and self-regard) as representing other tenants or the council or the local 
council tax payers more broadly.
As a theoretical model, the neutral allegiance model owes much to private 
sector idea(l)s. In this chapter, we draw on our key actor and Wandland data 
to illustrate how difficult it is for these two constituencies to balance their 
external interests with the required neutral allegiance to the LSVT RSL.
Derivation
The neutral allegiance model appears to be a ‘crossover’ concept, adopted 
from models of corporate governance. As we noted in the introduction, the 
neutral allegiance model was explicitly adopted by the Hancock inquiry into 
RSL governance at a crucial time during the 1990s when the number of LSVT 
RSLs were expanding. 
The private sector model requires directors of companies to act solely in the 
interests of the company itself, and not take account of personal or other 
external interest in the name of the fiduciary duty to the company. Be that as it 
may, there is in fact some doubt as to whether the initial statement 
represented the true empirical and legal position even in the mid-1980s (see 
Parkinson, 1993). Nevertheless, one may speculate that its adoption in purest 
form in LSVT RSLs may have been designed to ensure and reflect the non-
public nature of those bodies. The adoption of private sector governance 
models – perhaps more rigorously than the private sector itself operated –
added to the apparent private sector nature of the organization being created. 53
The inclusion of local authority and tenant constituencies, whose ability to 
defend their stake is tempered by this model, suggests the overriding 
importance of accountability to regulators and funders rather than their 
respective constituencies. 
The Housing Corporation and National Housing Federation have made the 
neutral allegiance mode clear in their literature. For example, the National 
Housing Federation states that 
‘All board members share responsibility for its decisions. Each should act only in the 
interests of the organisation and not on behalf of any constituency or interest 
group’(2004, 8). 
Furthermore, board members ‘should recognise that their responsibility is to 
the organisation alone and not to the body that might have nominated them to 
the board’ (Rochester and Hutchinson, 2002: 38; cited in Audit Commision, 
2004). They further elaborate that RSLs 
… need to ensure that members are treated first and last as members of the RSL’s 
board and not as residents’ representatives, local authority nominees or 
independents. The legal and moral responsibilities of board members to the RSL 
should transcend – and be seen to transcend – any other commitments they have’ 
(30). 
The Housing Corporation states that ‘individual governing bodies members 
act in a personal capacity and not as nominees/representatives of any other 
body, unless the constitution so provides’ (2005: 5) and that they ‘expect the 
board members…to be there to ensure the sound running and effective 
governance of the organisation, and that’s not the same as representing 
collective interests of different groups’ (Interview, 2005). 
Despite this official line, there exists an acknowledged tension for tenants and 
council members:
‘Many tenants of [LSVT] housing associations feel they are on the board to 
‘represent’ a constituency of tenants. Often this misapprehension is a direct result of 
mis-selling (sic) the role at the time of the ballot. At the time of the transfer, tenants 
are often led to believe that they will have an explicit role in representing the interest 
of their fellow tenants on the board. This is not compatible with the accepted principle 
that dictates that as a board member they have to work for the interests of the 
organisation – that is, that the directors’ responsibility takes supremacy. […] resident 
board members are not there in a representational capacity’ (Audit 
Commission/Housing Corporation, 2004: 45).
The Audit Commission also acknowledge that this ‘confusion is reinforced […] 
by most residents coming onto the board via an elective route’ (id). There is 
evidently a tension for both tenants and councillors that their position will have 
been democratically granted but cannot be so exercised. In this regard, 
Clapham and Kintrea (2000: 547), in a stuffy of community based housing 
associations, point out that board members are placed in an ambivalent 
position; ‘they [are] representatives without the means to represent’.. 54
The Audit Commission report highlights this issue as particularly problematic 
stating that ‘there remains a particular need to progress the debate [about 
resident involvement] with regards to resident board members’ (2004: 51); 
and more strongly that ‘confusion […] abounds in the [housing association] 
sector about whether residents sit on the board in an individual capacity or 
whether they are there to represent other residents’ (2004: 39). Indeed its 
primary recommendation was that
‘The Housing Corporation and the Office of the Deputy prime Minister should 
consider whether current advice and support on the recruitment of resident board 
members in LSVT associations and arms length management organisations is 
adequate to address the common misperception that they are there in a 
representational capacity’ (2004: 8),
and more generally that the Housing Corporation ensures
‘that existing guidance and good practice on the role and purpose of resident board 
members is effectively communicated to housing associations; and monitor and 
evaluate the effect of this guidance and good practice to ensure that misperceptions 
of the role of the resident board members are corrected’ (Audit Commission/Housing 
Corporation, 2004: 8).
On the other hand, ODPM guidance on the setting up of Arms Length 
Management Organisations, which like LSVT RSLs are to include tenants, 
local authority nominees and independent members, explicitly specifies that 
‘tenant board members should be elected by their fellow tenants to ensure 
that they are genuinely representative’ (emphasis added) (Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister, 2004, 12). The ODPM themselves raised this contrast 
with us during our interview:
‘Well its, the odd thing is, … ALMO Board members are actually all elected, tenant 
board members are elected. So there's this sort of perceived, from the tenant 
perspective, slight sort of schizophrenia about the fact that the election process is not 
automatic with LSVT Board members…And I must admit I think it’s quite difficult to 
reconcile that, because the board membership issue, of what a Board member is, 
applies equally to an ALMO board member as it does to a housing association board 
member. So that can’t be the obstacle or the issue in itself, so therefore there must 
be another reason why its perceived as different, or operates as a different way as 
the housing associations…Because I had a long chat with the ALMO people and I 
said ‘Was it about representativeness i.e. that people have that democratic legitimacy 
to sit on that board?’. And they felt it was integral and important that that happened, 
but nobody was under an illusion that once on the Board, this is the theory, they then 
became part of the board.’ 
Tensions in the neutral allegiance model
The neutral allegiance model contains inherent tensions for councillors and 
tenants. They are expected to shed their identity in one arena – which is likely 
to be particularly important to them and their raison d’etre for their board 
membership – in order to take on the guise of neutrality in another arena. Our 
key actors identified a number of tensions: the regulatory context; the difficulty 
of explaining the notion described by Clapham and Kintrea as ‘representatives 
without the means to represent’; the political and the personal.55
The first tension concerned the broad regulatory environment. The 
requirement that RSLs are independent of councils and other interest groups. 
Means that members of the board should not, in theory, be representing other 
interests. That creates tensions at certain times:
The Local Authority should not be feeding through, it is an independent organisation. 
Whilst we expect the new landlord to consult, it must be independent and not require 
consent of the Local Authority. The transfer agreement establishes that relationship. It 
is custom and practice that the Local Authority is a member of the board (housing 
Corporation Registration Unit, paras 57-61).
Because your responsibility as a board member is not … is to represent the board.  I 
mean that’s PLC territory if you like.  Yeah it’s within the ways companies work.  And 
what you can’t have and particularly in a housing association where in theory … […] 
… you could have tenants for example preventing a rent increase, which the 
organisation needs for its financial viability but the tenants are opposed because 
they’re representing the tenants (CML, para 787).
Secondly, most key actors recognised that there were difficulties in upholding 
and even explaining this regulatory requirement particularly against the 
common misconception that tenants and councillors sat on the board in some 
sort of democratic (be it participatory or representative) capacity to defend 
and uphold the interests of tenants or the council respectively. The Chartered 
Institute of Housing interviewee noted that, given the diversity of the tenant 
population, the democratic, representative model of tenant board membership 
appeared problematic. Conversely, councillors  retain board membership on 
the basis that they (ie the council) can retain control of the new RSL which 
itself, proves problematic. Indeed, at the CML representative noted, the 
problem for councillors is that the new RSL operates unlike the old housing 
committee:
Councillors, equally, you know a number of councillors, who in a sense are hoping 
this will be a replication of the housing committee, suddenly find that of course it isn’t 
the housing committee, it’s got an agenda which is entirely different and focussed 
upon that service alone, and has none of the political nuances. (CML)
A representative of the Housing Corporation’s Registration Unit commented 
that communicating to tenant members that they were not representatives or 
advocates but rather just part of a group of corporate board members was 
‘one of the most difficult things I have to get over to the board’ (Para 49). A 
representative of the ODPM concurred with the emphasis on independence:  
[…] we have to try and encourage them not to see themselves as tenant, as 
representing the tenants, because they're not. The local, we say to the local authority 
members ‘You're not representing the local authority.’ Er and we have this discussion 
with large metropolitans, who like to think that if they put their councillors on the 
Board they have um you know, a say. I say no you don’t, leave that behind, they are 
there as an area where we have drawn some independents who come, independent 
of mind, and thought, and should be giving their skills to this new organisation. And 
the tenant members are no different. 
There were also, however, significant problems which may be caused by the 
mis-selling of LSVT to tenants56
 think if you, well, I mean I think it’s true to say that every transfer will be sold 
differently, um and I, the best ones don’t have to be sold, they come out of a natural 
process, and it’s, but if we’re being real worldly about it, then there is always some 
element of selling on every initiative. But I think if you're selling it effectively you're not 
saying that you will have a voice, what you're saying is that this will be run by an 
independent organisation which will have representatives from these groups, but it 
ends up as the (unclear) you will have a voice in this. Doesn’t it? It’s bound to. And 
people say well I've got a voice in how I run this, and you know, you're quite right, that 
sounds quite attractive, doesn’t it? (ODPM, Para 348).
The logical extension of the constituency model is that tenants and councillors 
sit on the board to provide democratic representation and accountability. As 
David Walker explained, there is more to having tenants on boards than user-
insight; there is also a democratic flavour to both the model and prevailing 
policy (even if this emphasis was to provide popular appeal rather than 
genuine accountability):
David Walker: [T]here's been lots of talk about trying to infuse […] new energy into 
the community representative structures, to reinvigorate society, most of which 
activity embodies some representative principle. And if public policy in social housing 
says no, the representative principle will not apply, you might observe a certain 
discontinuity (Para 78).
Why do RSLs need to think of having tenants on their board, when they are providing 
a service, and as good service providers, by their very nature will pay attention to the 
tenant’s experience? Tenants [are] on the board because of a throw back to an older 
model of governance where you do have some measure of representative ness, 
where you move in some measure towards a more cooperative style of relationship 
between service provider and service receiver. And I think, you know, RSLs again are 
somewhere in the middle of a, of that quagmire […] (Para 106).
Third, the personal and the political identity of the individual board member 
must feature at some point in their identity as board member. Although no 
doubt possible in theory, the practical reality is that multiple identities are 
problematic. In other words, the empirical reality of everyday life makes such 
multiple identities difficult. This version was most clearly articulated by our 
LGA interviewee. Whilst the other key actors interviewed for this study took 
the regulatory principle as their starting point and thus balanced or pushed 
aside the representative principle, the LGA interviewee’s conceptual starting 
point was the democratic, representative principle. Our interviewee perceived 
there to be a direct and logical link between including councillors because of 
their stakeholder interest and their acting as representatives of that interest, 
not least because of their accountability duties to the nominating body. 
Now ... yes, but they're put on the board because they're councillors ... which is, I 
would have said, a circular argument.  And I don't see how ... I cannot see ... and 
maybe I'm being stupid here ... I cannot see how the Housing Corporation can 
differentiate their role as a councillor as being a board representative ... because 
they're a councillor (LGA, Para 332).
I can't understand personally the logic of why you would say right we'll have a third 
you know councillor representatives on there without them performing an LA function.  
Because they've been put on there as LA reps, as councillors.  And that's the reason 
why they're on there, because they're ward members.  Now I don't see any ward 
member ever who sits on a board of anything and doesn't refer to their function in the 
council. […] And they will ... I mean I talk to councillors who are board reps and they 57
talk to me about how their LSVT is running and everything else, and they clearly see 
themselves as being tied in with the council and the council plan […]. […] So I can 
see where […] the Corporation are coming from, but I think I can clearly say to you 
that my members don't feel that way  (LGA Para 102).
The personal vulnerability of this multiple identity was noted by the CML 
interviewee:
And I think fundamentally, […] you’ve got the tension about what are the councillors 
and tenants there to do.  They’re taking on a new corporate responsibility, but sitting 
on their shoulders if you like are old corporate responsibilities, and they’re not 
reconciled.  I think they’re left quite vulnerable actually.  Personally vulnerable and 
collectively vulnerable, with you know people being very uncertain about what they’re 
doing (Para 123).
Our key actors recognised, however, that the problem was much more stark 
for tenant board members. Our ODPM interviewee expressed the problem:
The difficulty for them though, for the tenant …, they go home to houses that are 
owned and managed by this organisation with neighbours who are going to be 
affected by the decisions the board make. And when they're thinking about what the 
rent rise is, you know it’s a very difficult position to put someone in isn’t it? (ODPM, 
Para 344).
… I think tenants are put in an invidious position, and I would hate to be a tenant 
board member, who has to go back to my estate, and be held responsible. I think we 
put them in a very difficult position, and I feel sorry for them actually, but that’s my 
personal view not….
But we do, I believe, and as I say, put them in a very difficult position, because 
everybody else walks home at night elsewhere (ODPM, Para 80-84).
In our Wandland data, Councillor 3 observed that particular tensions and 
issues arose as a result of the election of a new tenant representative:
We've now got a couple of tenant representative board members and they're in an 
interesting position because they've been elected on by tenants.  Are they shop 
stewards for the tenants?  Are they representing the tenants with whom they live?  
Are they representing the whole of the tenant board?  Now we sit and we talk about 
this mythical group they are representing tenants.  Um ... yeah fine.  Excuse me, you 
know, what mechanisms do we have for ensuring they know and understand the 
views of all tenants?  How do they project the multiplicity of views of all tenants?  
They're not representing themselves.  I think they're in a very very difficult position.  
However, the only way I can see is if we have sufficient of them - five or six - then the 
sheer diversity of themselves will in part reflect the diversity of tenants and tenants' 
views.  But they are not shop stewards for the housing area from which they come.  
(para 268)
I don't live the life of a tenant, I don't live the life of councillor.  Councillor is something 
I do every now and then. Whereas a tenant is a tenant is a tenant.  And lives with 
tenants and is known as tenants and is bombarded ... was elected by tenants.  I 
haven't got a clue who elected me.  In fact it's very very few people in five villages.
Although most of the stakeholders perceive the tensions and ambiguity which 
arise from the conflict between the constituency model and the regulatory 
requirement of independence, they also by and large believed that there were 
more pragmatic ways of dealing with the tension. Further, the tension could 58
be dealt with through education and training – indeed, a particular feature of 
the key actor interviews was the reliance placed upon training. 
I think a lot of [tenant board members] see themselves as representatives of tenants, 
and I think that there is a shift that has to happen between, well I think its striking a 
balance between being representatives of tenants and tenant’s views, but also being 
representative for that org- a representative for that organisation (Para 83). […]. So I 
its, I think in reality it’s a dual role (NHF, Para 89).
I think some councillors…again, and it comes down to […] how strong the 
governance mechanism is, as to whether you’ve got proper standing orders, terms of 
reference, codes of conduct, all of those things in place. I think some councillors can 
find that if those aren't all in place or they're a bit woolly, that they're, they don’t quite 
know where their role as councillor ends, and where their role as a board member 
begins. And I think that is, you know its horses for courses, and I can't give any more 
information than that. But you I think you know there is a potential there always, for 
people to be talking with their councillor hat on. And not realising that actually you 
should be talking as a board member (NHF, Para 129).
We’ve been discussing how the fact that…precisely what we were saying is that once 
you're on the board you are a board member, and you haven't got constituents, and 
what we’re looking at is training of tenants so they are as well versed in all the various 
technical aspects of running an organisation, as are the independents. The 
independents when they come onto the board, um land with their feet moving as it 
were. (Chair LSVT RSL, Para 181)
‘Skilling up’ tenants will, thus, enable them to become effective governors, 
essentially to make them more like the ‘genuine independents’. The 
implication is that good governing skills are akin to the more ‘business’ or 
‘commerce’ skills which independents tend to exhibit, a view perhaps 
reinforced by the ODPM and HC insistence on the board displaying particular 
skill-sets and by the regulatory neutral allegiance model requirement itself.
Alternatively, interviewees felt that a line could be drawn between the neutral 
allegiance model and a participatory democratic approach. 
[Tenant board members] should be just taking a view in an equal way, as the 
independents and the local authority members […] of tenant issues that are coming 
up. But they're there in a way to make sure that they come up, but they're not there 
as the advocate of them, are they? And I think you know, you’ve got to, that that’s 
sometimes difficult for some tenant board members, but I think the tenant board 
members, but I think the tenant board members who move beyond that find it a much 
more satisfying role (ODPM, Para 227).
The analogy might be with school governing bodies where you have parents, and in 
theory you have parents are not meant to be there to represent little Johnny or Janey, 
they're there to be generic parents. Similarly the tenant is there to be a generic 
tenant, rather than someone who wants their problem done at number 36 you know 
(David walker, Para 114).
Wandland HA: Pragmatism, contradiction and conflict
In this section, we draw on our case study data to illustrate, first, that our 
board member interviewees generally accepted the neutral allegicance model; 
secondly, how they were able to accommodate that role specifically through 59
adopting an understanding of their strategic role as board members; but also 
how conflicts and contradictions between the roles emerged in seven specific 
examples.
General
What emerged from our data at Wandland HA on this issue reflects those 
tensions inherent in the model. What was perhaps most interesting was the 
way in which tenant and councillor board members, on which we focus in this 
section, mostly ‘bought into’ the neutral allegiance model. They recognised 
that their duties were to the organisation and not to other interests. There 
was, therefore, a distance between the personal/political and their board 
membership:
I've actually got my position on the board is because I'm a Liberal Democrat 
Councillor.  But when we're actually there for a board meeting that doesn't come into 
it really.  It's just everybody is a person.  And whatever they happen to input to that 
particular meeting.  You know the experiences life experiences or anything else that 
have evolved over time. (Councillor 1)
Yes I'm there as a tenant and I'm putting that side of it, but I don't represent the 
tenants.  It's the board has got to work.  The board has got to work.  And if the 
board's going to work you're not a tenant, you're not putting tenants' views, this is me 
speaking.  (Tenant 1).  
Others were able to substantiate their claim to neutrality, as opposed to 
representation, by reference to their ignorance of the views of their party or 
other tenants:
You have to shed your blatant party political.  I can't sort of divest myself of my 
values, cos those are what make me me.  I can't divest myself of my life experiences.  
So I am that person who happens to be a Lib Dem guy.  But fortunately ... largely 
because I'm pretty disinterested in many of these things ... I haven't got the slightest 
idea on what a Lib Dem policy on social housing is.  So I don't take that into me, I 
don't believe that we should be taking political baggage into the room. (Councillor 2)
I can’t say that I can possibly be representative of the leaseholders cos I don’t know 
them. (Tenant 5)
Having said that most subscribed to the moxdel, though, most also explicitly 
or implicitly, consciously or sub-consciously, at least hinted at contradictions 
in that role as well as conflicts. Indeed, of our board member interviewees, 
only Councillor 4 explicitly distanced themselves from the neutral allegiance 
model:
And there is the interesting problem, because, okay that’s the first instance. That’s my 
first role, my first duty [as a representative of my ward]. My second duty is to my 
group, my … party. Because I am there, again not because I'm a representative of [ ], 
but because I'm a member of the [ ] Party, and the [ ] group has chosen me as their 
representative on that Board. So I have a, an accountability to them as well (paras 
224-6)60
An Accommodation: Board Members as Strategists
The most regularly used metaphor in this regard was about the different ‘hats’ 
which people could wear. Becoming a board member required the appointee 
to wear a different hat from their usual, everyday experience. As members of 
the board, they were strategists unconcerned with the operational side of the 
business. So, for example, 
I think as a councillor and as a board member you're looking at the whole situation.  
And you get more of a balanced opinion over general things.  So you're trying to put 
yourself on both sides of a situation and weigh up and get a balanced opinion which 
comes in the middle which doesn't affect you.  So you don't take sides so to speak.  
So I think most board members actually do realise that and that's how they are 
working. (Councillor 5)
Well the board ... the board is sort of a governing body of the company.  We don't get 
involved in that level of ... like you say the nuts and bolts level ... but we sit there ... 
the board should sit there, discuss policies, you know ideas - solar heating, you know 
thermal heating whatever.  Maybe find out ... get people to ... you know get in touch 
with specialists to find out the practicalities of all these ideas.  Then discuss them and 
come up with what we think we've got the money to play for if we've got some money 
spare. (Tenant 6)
We're the company's policeman.  We're the company's think tank and you know 
hopefully we're ... like I said we give ideas, we do that and the board will be able to do 
it.  And hopefully you know the CEO officers of the company will listen to what the 
board members say. (Tenant 6)
This accommodation was particularly apparent when there was discussion at 
a board meeting about whether or not to purchase the council-run hostel for 
homeless applicants. At a strategic level, Tenant 1 offered an answer which 
melded both a tenant perspective with a strategic understanding:
But I said to them ... well if you don't have the homeless accommodation you're 
missing out on a section of our tenants that are going to come over. …  I mean I don't 
know quite how it's going to work if you don't have the accommodation for the 
homeless included in the package that the council wants to hand over.  And … I said 
well if we're going to accept tenants from the homeless and they keep it, we aren't 
going to have any background.  We're just going to get the tenant and we've got to 
house them.  And they said 'Oh we never thought of that.'  You know what I mean?  
They just saw it as bricks and mortar.  
Contradiction and Conflict: Specific Issues
The conflicts tended to be situational rather than general. We noted six such 
particular areas of conflict: (i) Confidentiality; (ii) Financial negotiations with 
the council; (iii) Relationships with housing officers; (iv) Political agenda; (v) 
Tenant participation; (vi) Election of tenant; (vii) rent arrears. Conflicts (i)-(iv) 
were experienced by councillor board members, or at least some of them; 
conflicts (v)-(vii) were experienced by tenant board members, or at least some 
of them.61
(i) Confidentiality
All board members were required to sign a confidentiality clause. This caused 
controversy amongst one or two councillors, who felt that the confidentiality 
clause conflicted with their obligations to the council and to their party 
colleagues. Councillor 4 particularly initiated this because this person felt that 
it threatened his ability to balance his role as board member and 
councillor/party representative. Councillor 4 interpreted the original draft of the 
clause as a ‘blanket policy’:
And everyone else had signed it. (laughs) And I sort of looked at it and said ‘no way’. 
Because I knew what would happen if I signed it, given the politics of the thing.
…
I said this is impossible, no councillor could sign this. Um so there was a bit of a hoo 
hah about that, because, I mean I'm not wanting to, I'm not involved, I don’t want to 
give the impression I'm sort of involved in some sort of brinkmanship in all of this, 
opportunity, but that was just, I could see that that would be a major issue of 
contention. So I said well, and that’s why I took it to our solicitor and he looked at it 
and he said ‘well it is, its absolutely draconian’, because you have to have a public 
interest clause, you know, whereby this is not right, and I have to say this is not right, 
because I represent not only the Board, I also rep- I'm there as a councillor 
representing residents. Who may or may not be council tenants. And if you're that 
hamstrung, then there's, there would be no possible, I could see in the long term no, 
it would be extremely difficult for councillors to play any role within that body, and play 
a role, a general housing role
What was interesting about this clause was that not all councillors felt the 
same way. Indeed, Councillor 3 noted that he worked on the basis of ‘iron 
trust’ and, although one could spend considerable time drafting such a clause, 
‘it’ll be forgotten within half an hour of being written’.
In fact, the confidentiality clause was re-negotiated and the final draft covered 
just items marked as ‘confidential’ on the agenda. Two points make this 
episode interesting – first, it was just that, an episode, which punctuated the 
norm of neutral allegiance, after which all (except Councillor 4) were able to 
revert to that norm. Second, it demonstrated that punctuations in the neutral 
allegiance model are often personal. They may be felt particularly acutely by 
certain persons and not at all by others, depending (perhaps) on external 
norms.
(ii) Financial negotiations with the council
Another example of the personal nature of conflicts were concerns over 
conflicts of interest caused by the negotiations between the council and the 
LSVT RSL over the cost of the properties to be transferred by the council. 
These were commercial negotiations in which the council had an interest in 
securing the highest possible offer and the LSVT RSL in securing the lowest 
price. Decisions over the valuation of the properties were therefore steeped in 
controversy. Councillors 1, 2 and 3 both recognised that there was a conflict 62
of interest and declared that during council meetings. Other Councillor board 
members, however, did not do so. During our interview, Councillor 3 noted 
this contradiction between neutral allegiance and his dual role in this specific 
instance:
CLLR3: …I am therefore because I'm a Lib Dem councillor, but however having got 
there, my role is now as a board member.  
I:  Right.  
CLLR3:  And that creates conflicts, because there are sometimes ... and it amazes 
me how you know some of the others don't declare it, but if we are making decisions 
which impact upon ... financially impact upon ... the valuation decision ... 
I:  Yeah. 
CLLR3:  ... then 'Excuse me' (?) ... I have to withdraw from that.  And I have to 
withdraw in both chambers. (laughs) Because I cannot ... I can't bring myself to argue 
forcibly for A in this forum and then move into another forum and argue forcibly for B.  
Sorry.  If I could do that then I should be stuck in a chamber and isolated from 
humanity.  Probably could do actually ... yeah I think I probably could. 
Nevertheless, this person went on to explain:
, I think there are some who (pause) fail to appreciate the potential conflict.  Um, and 
there are some ... and that some could be one by the way, but I'll keep it as 'some' ... 
who openly and clearly speak politically.  So there is a political agenda being 
addressed rather than the board member agenda.  
On the other hand, Councillor 2 felt that no such conflict necessarily existed:
CLLR2: The other thing of course which I did raise back a while ago  on the board, 
um, I’m there as a board member, and so I don’t have to declare an interest when 
we’re talking about negotiations with the council, because we’re talking about big 
sums of money … but when I’m in the council chamber and we’re talking about the 
transfer and the sums of money, I’ve got to declare an interest as a board member.
I:  Do you leave the room at that point?  Or do you just declare a personal interest 
and then stay there? 
CLLR2:  I haven’t left the room because it hasn’t got the stage where I feel I ought to.  
But I make sure they know that I do have an interest.  If we start to talk about sums of 
money then I feel I will have to declare a prejudicial interest and leave the room.
(iii) Relationships with housing officers
Three councillor interviewees expressed the view that the change to an LSVT 
RSL weakened the link between themselves and the housing officers. This 
link was thought to be particularly valuable as it enabled them to deal with 
queries raised by their constituents. The shift to RSL meant that they no 
longer had that direct link. As councillor 2 noted:
And only this morning I had this discussion with the new chief executive.  I said I 
would want that to continue.  Because at one meeting we were told that as directors 
we would not be involved in the day to day running of the board.  And that’s right, 
that’s fair and proper.  But I want to continue that relationship wearing my other hat as 63
a councillor.  What I don’t want people to do is to think … when they see me going 
into the offices to see the officers ‘Here comes one of the board members’ … or 
directors.  I want them to see me as a district councillor.
The use of this hat wearing metaphor at this point underlined the difficulty of 
wearing two hats – councillor/board member – simultaneously.
(iv) Political agenda
This point has already been discussed above. We did ask our Councillor and 
tenant interviewees whether they felt that they were councillor/tenant or 
individual when sitting on the board. For Councillor 4, this questions was 
relatively easy – he clearly regarded himself as a councillor, something which 
the tenant board members both recognised and disparaged:
I think councillors who serve on a Board have to remember that what they're doing is 
non political, and some councillors are very political, and I'm not just talking here but 
some councillors are very political. And that can sometimes make things difficult, 
because of their political views, you know their…
…
It’s the hat thing, it’s exactly the same for a tenant isn't it? In the same sort of situation 
really. (Tenant 2)
(v) Tenant participation (general)
Whilst councillors may be expected to have some form of political agenda, the 
same was true (as Tenant 2 noted above) for tenants as regards tenant 
participation. Tenant 1 noted the importance and relevance of engaging in 
tenant participation as that would enable them to be representative of all 
tenants:
It's a strange one.  But my view on it is if you're not out there working with the tenant 
panel doing whatever little bit of work they're doing, or with the forum going ... how 
can you get a varied view from other tenants.  If I was isolated in this flat and I never 
spoke to anybody how can I say that I'm representative of all the tenants?
Indeed, this conflict particularly became apparent when there was a 
discussion initiated by officers as to the appropriateness of tenants being 
officers in the tenants’ forum. It was felt that, were tenants to have such a role, 
there may well be a conflict of interest. For tenant 1 and 2, this raised a point 
of principle as they wanted to continue their involvement with the tenants 
forum and would have resigned from the board if this was constrained. In the 
end, a compromise was reached that tenant board members could be 
involved but just not as officers of the forum, although they could be officers of 
their local residents’ association:
Well I, I got a little bit stroppy I suppose, er and I said um ‘if it comes to that I have to 
give up representing my lo- my Tenant and Resident’s Association on the forum, then 
I will give up being a Board member. Because to me it is more important, it is very, 
very important, and probably more important to have your input from your tenants. 
(Tenant 2)64
Tenant 2 sought to resolve any conflicts of interest between involvement with 
local residents’ association and board membership by discussing what should 
happen if there was a vote against the tenants’ interests:
I said look there is this dialogue going on about being members of a tenants and 
residents association and being a Board member, and I said it might mean that on 
occasion, I would have to vote against something that you might actually not like very 
much or, you know, for something that you might not like very much, because it’s the 
best, its in the best interests of the company, and how would you feel about that? And 
they said ‘well that’s fine’. They didn’t see any problem with that at all. They said ‘but 
you represent our interests, you're taking forward what we’re saying to the tenant’s 
forum, the fact that you might have to vote against on the Board’, they did not see as 
a problem. So that’s all I could do was to go to my members and say ‘this is the 
problem. Do you perceive there to be one?’ and they didn’t. (laughs)
Even so, Tenant 2 and others made clear that they sought to filter the views of 
the tenants’ forum and residents through to the board:
I take their views forward to the Board. They’re not necessarily my views because I 
chair their organisation. And as chair you take forward your organisation’s views don’t 
you? (Tenant 2)
Lots of tenants come and talk to me as a member of the residents association. 
Sometimes they come and talk to me knowing I’m a board member when they think 
they’ve got a good idea.  And I think that openness (inaudible) I had one before the 
last board meeting.  Somebody came up to me and said ‘These tolerated 
trespassers, what happens to them?’  And I thought ‘Yeah you’ve got one living next 
door to you haven’t you, and you’re scared shitless that they’re going to be turned 
into a secure tenant.’  And I thought this hasn’t been mentioned at any point through 
the process.  So I’ll save it till the end of the board meeting, which I did at the last 
board meeting.  Which left everyone’s jaw dropping because they’d go scurrying 
away and they … they haven’t answered me yet. (laughs) (Tenant 3)
In an interesting exchange between the interviewer and tenant 3, concerning 
the importance of the local rural interest as opposed to the predominance of 
the general urban in tenant participation, an appreciation of conflict was 
apparent, how that conflict might be resolved pragmatically, but also how 
conflict may nevertheless arise again:
I:  There was something … you mentioned about you wanted to make sure that [ ] got 
its fair share.  So to what extent do you still see yourself as … I use the word 
‘representation’ in inverted commas as being there for the interests of this particular 
area.  
TEN3:  On the board I don’t.  
I:  You don’t, okay.  
TEN3:  Right, because it is actually quite easy to differentiate between the two.  For 
something to individually affect [ ] and actually reach board level … it’s just not going 
to happen.  
I:  But is there … you sort of … well maybe I misread the way you were saying it … 
there was a sort of implication that maybe the rural areas might be differently 
represented … 65
TEN3:  Oh yes, that’s different yes.  
I:  Yeah okay so to what … 
TEN3:  I still feel um … tenant participation historically has centred around Carrick 
and Bochester, the people involved in leading tenant partic- … the tenants involved 
are still centred around Bochester and Carrick.  I am determined that those areas will 
not see the level of preferential treatment they’ve had in the past because of that.  
You know to my mind it has to go across the tenant base, not to isolated pockets of 
interest.  So yes I’m there to ensure there’s fair play but I’m also there sometimes to 
give a counterargument.
Tenant 3 sought to resolve the potential conflicts pragmatically by arguing that 
the board was responsible for strategy and local operational issues would not 
be the subject of explicit enquiry or decision. On the other hand, Tenant 3 also 
recognised that s/he saw their role as a corrective to the balance and was, 
thus, in representational mode. This was subsequently made explicit during 
the interview:
So yeah I mean when I’m sitting on the board I tend to try and think as a board 
member … which is very different from the local domestic issues out here. But yes, at 
the back of my mind there’s always the feeling to make sure that all tenants are going 
to benefit from the decisions made rather than just those that have high influence in 
tenant participation.  Because the problem is if you empower tenant participation to 
the level that it’s been empowered in Wandland over the last few years and you don’t 
have enough tenants involved within that tenant participation group or forum then one 
could argue that their input is not actually robust enough to take things forward. And 
that’s probably my major concern at the moment.
(vi) Election of tenant
Tenant 6 had recently been elected to the board by a general ballot of other 
tenants. Previous chapters have detailed the issues raised for the neutral 
allegiance model by this method of appointment as well as the empirical 
issues caused on the ground during the electoral process (ie the problem 
caused by having a short statement made by each candidate in which the 
candidate claimed that they would be the best person to represent the tenant 
body on the board).
(vii) Rent arrears
There was much discussion at a board meeting about what the LSVT RSL’s 
policy on rent arrears should be. At what point, if at all, should the RSL take 
possession proceedings. The principal conflict here was between three poles 
– the knowledge of tenants as tenants as to why rent arrears arise in the first 
place; the nature of the tenant as board member; and the strategic role of the 
board. It was in seeking to balance these three positions that differences 
emerged amongst tenant board members. Put another way, the question 
which emerged from this conflict was the extent to which tenant board 66
members should advocate for other tenants. This discussion then concerned 
the representative nature of tenant board members at the sharp end.
Generally, we observed that, though some tenant members do tend to jump to 
the defence of tenants when an item is perceived to harm tenant interests, 
equally some tenant board members were fairly intolerant of non-ideal 
tenants. The discussion about rent arrears illustrated this dissonance. This 
board meeting was the first that Tenant 6 had attended, after being voted onto 
the board. Tenant 6 was concerned about the approach adopted by other 
board members:
I was a little bit annoyed on Wednesday night ... was some of them seemed to think 
they were directors of the company and they were the ones who were putting their 
own money into it.  And they were getting a little bit ... um, you know let's not care 
about the tenants ... on the social side of it, as being that it's a social housing 
association ... we're going to be hard as nails and if they don't do this and don't do
that you know let's get the heavies in and throw them out 10 minutes later, like you 
know.  I felt that from particularly one person.  I don't think I need to say who, I think 
you know.  Mm?  Yes?  Going on about rent arrears heavily.  Um ... yes you've got to 
keep up on top of rent arrears.  After the meeting I was talking to her ... to the person 
... you can leave that out there ... and she did apologise to some extent and say she 
didn't mean it like that.
 Conclusion
The neutral allegiance model has been read across from private sector 
models of governance. It has been done so in its purest form and there are 
doubts whether the neutral allegiance model reflects either the theory or 
empirical reality of private sector corporate board membership. Although our 
key actors and board member interviewees mostly subscribed to the neutral 
allegiance model, they all at least recognised that there were difficulties in its 
implementation. We have drawn attention, for example, to six areas in which 
the neutral allegiance model caused internal conflicts. What is interesting 
about these six areas is their uneven impact on the board members. Some 
only affected tenants, others only councillors. Even then, only some members 
of each constituency particularly felt there were conflicts and contradictions. 
What then emerges is a subjective, value-based, and very personal 
understanding of the neutral allegiance model as opposed to the positivistic, 
clear, ‘Chinese wall’ boundary implied by the model itself.67
8  THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
EXPERTISE 
Introduction
In this chapter we explore the ways in which skills, knowledge, educational 
and professional background, and experience are used to construct board 
members as actors with expertise, and at times, actors who lack expertise. 
Some might think that our definition of ‘expertise’ is too wide and broad –
‘experts’, after all, are people brought into a particular situation because of 
they possess certain knowledges or understandings that are specialist, cannot 
be found in the everyday. Courts bring medical or fire-arms professionals to 
provide the court with knowledge they do not have; government’s will call on 
‘experts’ to advise on agricultural or energy policy development. What, it may 
be asked, has ‘experience’, in particular the daily ‘lived’ experience of tenants 
as tenants, got to do with expertise? Experience is not the same as expertise.
However, as will become apparent from the data presented below, most of 
those who were involved in this research, whether they be board members, 
officers of the local authority or Wandland Housing, or the key actor 
interviewees, wanted to construct tenant experience as a skill or a form of 
knowledge that provided the board with understandings it would otherwise 
lack.  Indeed, it could be argued that the way out of the dilemma of 
representation discussed in previous chapters is to present tenant and 
councilor board members as experts in their respective fields: of tenant 
‘knowledge’, and council ‘knowledge’. We come back to this at the end of the 
chapter.
In this chapter we begin with a discussion of how our research subjects use 
this term expertise, and how it is used by the Housing Corporation in 
particular to construct particular subject positions for boards and board 
members. Then we look at how expertise is defined by, and for, each of the 
three constituency groups on the board. The next section focuses on financial 
expertise: if there is a hierarchy of expertise, then financial and business skills 
has been placed at the top by most research subjects. In this section we focus 
on how these expertises are constructed, and the way in which financial 
expertise in particular constructs particular positions for certain board 
members. This leads into a discussion of one of the principle difficulties with 
expertise, the  In the conclusion we return to the role of expertise in the 
‘representation dilemma’.68
Meanings and uses of ‘expertise’
One of the issues that framed this research project from the start was what 
appeared as the ‘official’ or authoritative view on the required expertise for the 
board of an LSVT. The ODPM sets out its expectations, in guidance given to 
those  local  authorities  contemplating  the  transfer  of  stock  to  a  registered 
social landlord (ODPM, 2004b):
13.17 The composition of the governing body should be such that it has the full 
range of business skills and financial acumen to be capable of managing a large 
organisation,  which  is  likely  to  have  significant  debt  at  the  outset.  This  will  be 
important not only for the new RSL but also for funders.
Many of our interviewees, including board members, would refer to financial 
and business skills when we asked about expertise, as if it were the critical 
area of expertise required by a board. As the CML interviewee pointed out, an 
LSVT can often become the largest business and employer in a locality. 
Frequently, interviewees would refer to the importance of the LSVT as a ‘large 
business’:
Chief Executive: those skills will be related to running a large business that covers 
quite a specialist area in terms of meeting housing and related needs so business 
skills and housing support related skills are quite important within the overall makeup 
of the board
For the CE, ‘business and financial skills’ meant trying to reflect a range of 
skills in the board: 
I am concerned about people as a resource and seeing people used effectively and 
that an awareness of the HR [human resources] issues is important to the process 
and skills to be able to cope with and deal with those issues and think things through 
is important. Not necessarily someone who is personnel or management qualified but 
someone who is used to managing numbers of people, so that would come into play. 
Beyond that I consider that having finance and legal are probably the main elements.
In effect, there appears to be an expectation that the board should try to 
encompass a range of professional expertises within its members: human 
resources, financial, and legal, and ‘asset management’ (Officer 5). Of course, 
the skills that the board has are not the only source of expertise that is 
available. Aside from the association's staff, consultants are a critical source 
of expert knowledge, particularly in the set-up stages of an LSVT.  We discuss 
the board's attitude to consultants below. However, here it is worth noting that 
whilst legal skills were considered to be essential, there is now becoming a 
view, reflected amongst our board members, that there was less need for the 
board to have a lawyer. The view appears to be that legal expertise could be 
‘bought in’, and indeed it may be better to do so than to rely on the lawyer on 
the board who is unlikely to have specialised in the particular area of law that 
is called for. 
Returning to the 'list' of professional expertises, Wandland's newly-appointed 
Financial Director recognised that this was a 'wish list', and something of an 
impossibility:69
Finance director: I think it’s probably a bit unreasonable to expect all those skills to 
be brought into a board, which is where I get…I mean I never quite understand where 
the housing corporation are coming from cos they seem to blow like the wind in terms 
of expecting boards to…board membership that covers a whole range of skills but 
also at a time when they’re looking to reduce the size of boards,
There was then an expectation from some that the board should have specific 
expertise relevant to the business of an RSL, an understanding of the sector, 
knowledge of construction and the process of RSL development, housing 
management knowledge and of its various sub-specialisms, e.g. the 
Supporting People regime (for funding vulnerable tenants), sheltered housing 
and housing for people with disabilities. As will be shown when we discuss the 
specific skills and knowledge of the members of the board of Wandland 
Housing, many of these skills are present, and it is the tenant members who 
have particularly brought these specialists knowledges.
However, all our interviewees felt that professional knowledge and skills was 
not sufficient. The NHF talked about having the ‘right spread of skills within 
the community’:
as far as tenants go the main skill that they bring would be a knowledge of where they 
live, um in the very widest sense.
The Chief Executive warned that in ensuring that professional skills were 
present on the board should not exclude the need for ‘community reps to 
bring in the view of the area it is working in’.
Why have 'experts' on the board?
The answer to, what sort of expertise does a board want might lie in the 
question, why have experts at all? Why does the board need experts in law, 
finance, housing development or housing management, when it has its 
officers - the Finance Director, Directors of Development and Housing 
Management, and Human Resources - to call on as experts in these areas? 
This question goes to the heart of what is the role of the board. In Chapter 2 
we discussed how the role of the board is set out in the training material 
produced by the National Housing Federation, and in the Corporation's policy 
documents. How did our interviewees view the role of the board? Is it to be 
strategic decision-maker for the association (as suggested by much of the 
corporate governance literature: see in particular McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999), 
to act as a monitoring body for the operations of the organisation, or as a 
sounding board for officers' proposals? Or, as one board member suggested, 
as a sort of jury:
Councillor4: And that’s why I come back to that jury idea of how I see it, as an 
arbitration really of, you know, different groups coming with different ideas to the 
area, we all discuss it, and come to a compromise.
In this view of a board's role, governing expertise becomes much more 
generic, not attached to any particular area of professional expertise. Indeed, 70
governors are not necessarily 'experts' at all, this is more like the 'citizens' 
jury' idea tried out by some local authorities (for example, Blackburn citizens’ 
jury sponsored by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, see Wakeford et al, 
2004).
A view that is frequently expressed, particularly by officers, is that expertise in 
particular specialisms is critical so that the board can challenge the proposals 
put forward by officers, almost as if they are not sure of their own expertise:
Chief Executive: we employ a finance team and a finance director and I would like to 
see on the board somebody with the skills and knowledge of operating something on 
the same sort of scale who can ask the right questions or see the weaknesses within 
that.
Independent 3: from the HR point of view because I knew quite a bit about that, that 
allowed me to challenge the whole recruitment process for the Chief Executive and 
finance director.
This need to have the officers opinions and proposals challenged is about  
reassurance; experts on the board can provide a sort of second opinion:
Ind3: I think there's a sort of reassurance to know there's someone there with that 
knowledge, but I don’t think we tended for instance um Ind2, who's the legal person 
we haven't sort of relied on him to give the only guidance from a legal point of view. 
Buts its reassuring to know that person, similarly if there was somebody how was an 
out and out accountant. 
However, there is also a paradox in wanting to have board experts who can 
challenge alongside paid, officer experts, which was highlighted by David 
Walker:
[T]he more expert a Board, the closer that Board gets to executive management, 
raising all sorts of questions about its capacity to manage, to… its capacity to subject 
executive management to quizzical attention, unless the non executive directors, 
despite their expertise, are able to maintain distance, which I think raises all sorts of 
issues. 
This ability to challenge is often referred to as applying proper scrutiny, and 
lack of expertise would mean that the board could not carry out this role. The 
Chief Executive of a long running LSVT considered that 'if you're serious 
about good corporate governance, you want to select everyone on the Board 
on the basis of their skills'. But where should the line be drawn between the 
experts on the board and those who are employed to be experts? David 
Walker again:
But it does to me, it kind of rests on a, a kind of unstated proposition about the nature 
of the Board that it somehow needs this knowledge, because otherwise what would 
happen? It wouldn’t be able to subject the decisions of the executive to proper 
scrutiny. But that as I say, that would imply logically that the knowledge of the Board 
was equivalent to that of the executive members.
However, only one board member questioned the need for expertise on the 
board:71
Tenant 6: You know if they've got particular skills what are needed well then you get 
somebody in with the skill needed.  Like the chief executive officer, he's got skills in 
social housing. He's worked in it.  
Expertise within the 'constituency' groups
We asked all of our interviewees what sorts of skills they thought the three 
constituency groupings, independents, councillors and tenants, brought to the 
board. About the independents there was a fairly uniform view - they were 
there specifically because of the skills and expertise they had. However, 
within all three groupings there was a recognition of expertise, knowledge and 
skills within the long list of requirements that seemed to be laid on the board; 
some councillors and tenants, as well as independents, recognised 
knowledge of business as part of what they could bring. The area of expertise 
that was least discussed was skills in governing, though it was recognised by 
some that this was a skill that councillors could bring. All on the board 
recognised that the tenant members came with considerable expertise; the 
value of this expertise seems to stem not simply from the fact that they are 
tenants, but because they of the experience they have gained through 
involvement in tenant participation processes and subsequent work such as 
Audit Commission Tenant Inspector and Investors in People inspector. In the 
following sections we look at expertise in each of the three constituencies.
Independents
One way of looking at the view taken by the ODPM and HC on expertise is 
that it legitimises bringing in 'outsiders', the independents who will have the 
skills. This was an understanding also perpetuated by the National Housing 
Federation interviewee:
I think the, I mean the expertise that the independents should be bringing are the 
specific skills that that organisation has decided that it has to have. So it could be I 
mean, I would suggest that you know, finance expertise, maybe development 
expertise, those kinds of specific skills… so that you can look at the papers and 
understand them because that is your profession. I think there always used to be law, 
I think was one of the things that people always wanted, I mean I'm fairly ambivalent 
about that because you can be a family lawyer, would that make you any, any more 
skilled? But I suppose you should at least be able to understand the make up of the 
legal documents, even if you don’t necessarily know any more about the content than 
anyone else.
This understanding also appears to have been transmitted to the independent 
board members themselves who, when asked about their role on the board, 
considered that they were there to bring in the required skills, particularly 
business skills and knowledge:
Independent 1: I think my role, in inverted commas, really is to bring some particular 
knowledge and expertise rather than passion.  
Independent 2: I felt because I'd been on the executive committee and effectively the 
managing board for my previous law firm for about 10 years I felt I had some ... in 72
some way I can contribute … The rest ... two thirds of the board were comprised of 
people based on a sort of um ... well maybe democratic or semi democratic method.  
And then it was more down to skills.  And one of the skills actually missing when I 
applied was the legal skill.  
Independent 3: I thought I added a general business like approach and knowledge of 
budgeting and finance. Probably did quite a bit in the HR side so, the people side was 
something I felt I could contribute to … I think the independents can look at it 
incredibly impartially, and keep coming back to the business side, and say here's this 
business like approach. 
Independent 4: My role as an independent is to input the skills that I have in strategic 
planning and resource (asset) management. … Generally the independent members 
are there to fill the skills gap - finance, legal, strategic planning.
This view, that it was really only the independents who could fill the skills gap, 
was a recurring theme. So, when asked about the skills of tenants, 
Independent 3 came back to the financial and business skills of the 
independent members, as compared to the skills brought by others:
I suppose, I would say the independents are mainly looking at whether this is an 
efficient business, whether its effective in the way its doing its financing, its budgeting 
and its business planning. So I think that probably comes in more from the 
independents than others. 
And another independent board member:
Independent 2: the independents I think because they'd been recruited for their skills 
and for their job roles um ... well to a certain extent I mean it cements the thing 
together a little bit.  Otherwise I think there would be ... I don't think there would be 
enough professional input into it.
So although this group are called 'independents', arguably it is not their 
'independence' that is being called upon, but their professional and business 
skills. Certainly, for the funders, it was the presence of the skills the 
independents could bring that was a significant factor in providing them with 
the reassurance that the RSL would be a good risk:
Funder: No problem with tenant members provided they have receive adequate 
training and support. Independent experts are deemed necessary however should 
significant borrowing be required. It is important there is in depth appreciation and 
independent thought on areas where a high level of technical expertise is required.
However, as was said in Chapter 2, it is the presence of the regulatory role of 
the Housing Corporation that is the primary factor in enabling funders to see 
RSLs in general, and even newly-established LSVTs, as a low risk:
Funder: We consider the RSL sector to be safe because it is regulated by the 
Housing Corp, which can put associations under supervision. They will actually 
pursue a merger if necessary.
The experience of one independent board member leads him/her to adopt an 
'expert leadership' role within one of the Working Groups. Independent1, who 
has been a surveyor, headed up the surveying department for a county 
council for many years, and started set up a small RSL 35 years ago, became 73
the chair of the Work Planning and Procurement Working Party. At Working 
Party meetings s/he adopted the role of leading others through the policies, 
often explaining issues rather than the leaving it to the officer present. The 
impact of his/her experience as a professional and LA officer perhaps meant 
that s/he would take on the officer role. When the proposed Procurement 
Strategy for the association is only circulated to board members the morning 
of the meeting, meaning that members had little/no time to read it, it was 
suggested that the discussion should be deferred to a future meeting. It was 
the chair who insisting, in support of the officer, that decisions must be made 
at this meeting because of the imminent Housing Corporation Pre-
Registration visit. Perhaps, however, the role adopted by Independent1 here 
has different elements of expertise attached to it. This board member has for 
many years been in the position of a local government officer; s/he is well 
aware of and has lived with the bureaucratic pressures that arise from 
inspection and audit regimes. In this instance s/he is transferring this 
understanding into the role of chair and leader of the working group.
Councillors
For the councillor board members, sometimes there appeared a struggle to 
identify what skills they could bring. 
Councillor 2:  I find difficulty answering that because there are certain board 
members who have particular expertise, and it’s quite clear what their main role is 
going to be.  Um, I don’t regard myself as having any particular expertise.  I try to 
bring common sense into most debates.  Fairness and openness.  And um … I don’t 
believe I’m an expert in anything.
One view, expressed by the NHF interviewee, was that they were a source of 
knowledge, and line of communication with, the council:
I think they act as a line of communication definitely, I mean I think there is that, um 
that they have a knowledge of what's going on within the council, they have a 
knowledge of what's, should be what's going on in the community. And I think at the 
initial stage of transition between it being local authority stock to housing association 
stock its useful to have, um its useful to have that.
This view, however, is surely contradictory with the 'neutral allegiance' model, 
which says that councillors should not be on the board to represent the 
Council's views, yet another example of the inherent tensions and ambiguities 
within the model.
There was some attempt at constructing a skill of governing,
LGA: if they're sitting there on a board with councillors, you know councillors are 
used to sitting in meetings and boring people ... (in whisper) didn't say that ... but you 
know they're used to dealing with all this, and they're also used to getting their own 
way in many respects and being important.74
Councillor 2: I am a school governor and I've been a school governor for 15 years.  
So although it's not the same thing, on the other hand the actual running of an 
organisation has similarities.  
Governing skills were portrayed as more generic skills, that were considered 
by some as important. For example, Officer5 said in discussing the process of 
recruiting board members 
they were looking for the skills that you need for a Board member, negotiating skills, 
and you know, the communication skills and how they would act at the Board 
meeting. 
Interestingly, this comparison with being a school governor was discussed by 
the ODPM interviewee, who seemed to suggest that the comparibility 
between school governor and HA board member was slight:
ODPM1: I mean there is a parallel there, um I think they're very different things … 
because the issues on the ground are very different. I think you know, providing 
someone’s education, and a quality education in a fairly rigorous framework, as lain 
down by, you know, central government. Um and about (pause) you're focusing on 
the role of that one school, whereas I think if you're an elected member, you know if 
you're a Board member of an RSL with 11,000 properties, and 11,000 … tenants and 
all that goes with that, is a much broader responsibility, I would suggest. Um I'm not 
downplaying the role of school governors by any stretch of the imagination, but I think 
the scale is different.
I:  So it’s an issue of scale?
ODPM1:  Scale, and I think the scope, that they have much broader scope and much 
more discretion in how they operate as an organisation, is my guess, knowing nothing 
about school governors…
ODPM2: Its also the range of activities isn’t it? That RSLs do, its not only about 
housing, its so much else that goes with it.
In the following example, a councillor compares his/her skills with those that 
independents bring:
CLLR5: Cos obviously as a board member for the independents, they need a 
qualified accountant and also a lawyer, solicitor.  So they're very specialist skills.  It 
gives me a general skill, as being a councillor gives me a general skill hopefully.  
Or another councillor considered that councillors' expertise lay not in 
understanding the detail of the decisions that the board had to make, but to 
relate them back to the impact they had on the community they represented:
Councillor 4: as a councillor I suppose, all you can do is try and skim it, see what 
you think that your community wants or, what your people who put you there want 
and make a value judgement. And I don’t think the detail and the training are er, are 
that important. its more, we’re more an executive I think, that would look upon the 
broad issues, and hopefully the minutiae is going to be done for us.
However, this view of the councillor role is in tension with the 'neutral 
allegiance model', as we discussed in Chapter 7. Indeed, it could be said to 
be this model that (in part) raises real problems for councillors and expertise. 
For, if they are serious about being a councillor, then representing the views 75
of their constituents is a significant part of their role, and therefore their 
expertise as a councillor; and yet the model does not appear to be able to 
recognise such experience as relevant. Nevertheless, leaving that issue to 
one side, the councillors' role on the board is seen by most councillor board 
members as to outside party politics:
Councillor 3:  You have to shed your blatant party political.  I can't sort of divest 
myself of my values, cos those are what make me me.  I can't divest myself of my life 
experiences.  So I am that person who happens to be a Lib Dem guy.  But fortunately 
... largely because I'm pretty disinterested in many of these things ... I haven't got the 
slightest idea on what a Lib Dem policy on social housing is.  So I don't take that into 
me, I don't believe that we should be taking political baggage into the room.
And another councillor thought that its was important 
Councillor 2: that I try to keep politics out as much as I possibly can. Because I think 
people matter far too much.  But I think it’s right that there should be people from 
different parties because we all have different ideas.
This view that housing associations should be a-political, outside of party 
politics, is one that has long been held by many in the housing association 
sector (see McDermont, 2005a: chapter 4). 
Given the difficulty that councillors have in making much of their councillor 
experience as valid in the LSVT board, it is unsurprising to find that, even 
when constructing expertise amongst councillors, there was a move to 
prioritise experience in business as a means of validating their position on the 
board:
Councillor 3:  … mine is a business background. … And therefore [the councilor with 
Cabinet responsibility for housing] wondered whether or not I would be willing to go 
and seek to apply some form of business acumen, business viewpoint to 
counterbalance the wonderful caring 'I'm a charity and I love the human race, 
therefore we'll do everything for everyone' 
NHF: I think that there, theoretically there's no reason why they should have any 
different skills than any of the independents, um or any of the tenants, as far as 
knowledge of the community, or they could be lawyers and accountants like anyone 
else and therefore bring those skills on. I think that as far as the fact that they are 
councillors it would just simply be as we were talking earlier about making sure that 
that interest is kept form the transition from the council to the housing association. 
And I think probably their influence on that Board over time will diminish.
Tenants
It was with the tenants that we began this research project. Referring to work 
by Larner and Butler (2005) concerning the developing of partnering in 
community, McDermont suggested in an earlier paper that a new field of 
expertise, governance expertise, might be developing. 
It is into this new field of expertise that tenant governors may be able to insert 
themselves, coming as they do with a certain 'authorisation', a claim to 'speak 76
authoritatively' on the subject of tenants (2005b; also see McDermont, 2007 
forthcoming).
However, this paper also suggested that expertise or professionalisation 
might be a 'diving practice' (Foucault 1983): dividing tenants from other 
professionals because their expertise was seen as less valid (the concern that 
tenants may be seen as second class board members, discussed at the end 
of this chapter); or dividing tenant board members from other tenants because 
as governor they must hold the interests of the association as paramount, not 
those of tenants.
The evidence from this research project suggests that the construction of 
tenant board members' expertise is not quite as one might expect. The tenant 
board members were well respected by other board members because of the 
expertise they were able to bring. This expertise was not solely based on their 
experience as occupiers of social housing, but also through experience in a 
range of tenant participation structures at local and regional level. In addition, 
one tenant was also a Tenant Inspector for the Audit Commission, and 
another was an Investors in People inspector, which was seen as highly 
relevant to the board's development.  One board member observed that there 
were only two 'real' or 'true' tenants on the board. 
The tenant board members constructed their own expertise in a number of 
ways. Firstly, a number of them had been very involved for a number of years 
in the tenant participation structures set up by Wandland Council. This meant 
that they had a longer experience of the process of transfer than the other 
board members, as the Tenant's Forum had been involved in the consultation 
process from near the beginning. 
Tenant 1: the tenants have been so involved in this transfer it's unbelievable.  And I 
was amazed that we had the ... the ability to do it ...
Several have been involved in setting up tenants' groups, for example in 
sheltered accommodation schemes. One tenant is also a member of a 
county-wide tenants' and residents forum. Two of the tenant board members 
have attended a course in tenant participation run by a local university, funded 
by the Council. So they can validate their expertise on the basis of taught 
knowledge as well as knowledge and skills acquired through experience. 
The second mechanism through which they construct their own expertise is 
by drawing upon aspects of their lives prior to becoming board members. For 
example, two of the tenant board members claim expertise in disability issues 
through caring for family members with disabilities. For one of these board 
members, this appears to have led into a general interest in policies of 
housing management: this board member becomes chair of the Policies and 
Procedures Working Party, devoting considerable time to examining the 
proposed policies prepared by the consultants and officers.
The third level of expertise was perhaps the most visible: expertise gained 
from being 'inspectors of expertise'. One tenant board member had become a 
Tenant Inspection Adviser to the Audit Commission, meaning that s/he was 77
part of teams of inspectors carrying out inspections of RSLs and local 
authority housing services. S/he used the knowledge and experience gained 
in this forum to impress upon the board that s/he knew what would be 
required by the regulator, the Housing Corporation. Another tenant board 
member was an Investors in People inspector. Whilst this experience did not 
relate quite so directly as that gained from Audit Commission work, s/he was 
able to bring an understanding of what was considered to be 'best practice' in 
public service delivery. The other board members show a general level of 
respect for the tenants because of their range of expertises:
Independent 3:  I wouldn’t say entirely, because some of the tenant members 
actually come with a hell of a lot of expertise, they are doing things other than actually 
just being a tenant you know. Whether they're, one of them is an IIP auditor for 
instance, one of them is going round doing inspections of other um housing Boards 
and other people have quite business interests, so they are bringing other things into 
the party. 
It was at the board and working group meetings that the expertise of the 
tenant board members was more in evidence. Indeed, in the interview with 
Officer 2, s/he confirms our observations: that, quite contrary to what might 
have been anticipated, it is the tenants that are the most vocal at board, 
working group meetings and training sessions. Indeed, our observer 
comments at one point that board meetings are dominated by two tenant 
members. They demonstrate their expertise not just by being heard, but also 
by taking the lead. So, for example, the expertise of Tenant3 in housing 
management issues leads the observer to comment about one Working 
Group meeting that a particular item was run as a sort of conversation 
between Officer 5 and Tenant 3. In another discussion about the role of 
Tenancy Support Officers, the observer commented that Tenant 3 'acts like a 
teacher/explainer and emphasises that this is all about people not 
mechanisms.' Tenant 3 is able to use his/her expertise in a way that is similar 
to Independent 1 (above). For example, the observer at one training session 
noted:
[Tenant 2’s] experience is unique, and relates directly to the board’s ability to address 
the concerns of the regulator, for Tenant 2 was able to point to those issues that are 
of concern in inspections, as in her comment above about ‘going into coloured traffic 
lights that are not green’ (referring to the Housing Corp’s system of regulatory 
warning signals).
Financial in/-expertise
To nearly all of those we interviewed for this research, financial expertise 
played a critical role, for a number of reasons. First, it was clearly specified by 
the Housing Corporation and the ODPM (see quote above) as being one of 
the areas of expertise that the board should incorporate in its membership. 
The Corporation's justification for this, also evident in the ODPM, is that the 
association would be engaging in borrowing a large sum of private finance 
from the outset, and therefore the board must be able to understand the 78
implications for the association and be able to work with this. However, it also 
appears as part of the broader aim of changing the culture, inculcating a 
business ethic into the organisation, the 'wind of change' that our ODPM 
interviewee talked about. Indeed, 'financial and business' expertise were often 
almost treated as being synonymous.
The second reason why financial expertise played an important part in our 
research was the board's perceived lack of expertise in this field. The officers 
and board had tried, but so far failed to recruit an accountant to the board. 
Like many of the board members, the chair was particularly aware that there 
was a gap in the board's skills, and had been making efforts to fill the vacant 
independent board member's place with an accountant through contacts from 
his/her previous employment. S/he expressed surprise that no-one was 
interested, because after all, it 
looks good on the CV. I wish I had done something like this much earlier in my 
career, but there were always time problems, too busy with work commitments.
Lack of financial expertise was also expressed as an individual concern by 
board members. Some board members openly expressed not just an 
(alleged) ignorance of financial issues, but a fear of addressing the issues of 
finance within the context of the association, perhaps mostly because the 
sums involved seem huge:
Tenant 1:  It really scared the pants off me when I seen it.  The first ever financial 
statement they gave me, with all those damned 'O's.  I'd had nothing to do with 
finance at all ... my own obviously.  
Tenant 5:  It's a lot of money.  Or it seems like a lot of money to the average person 
sitting there.  … And you suddenly realise gosh we're responsible for that.  And then 
the actual large sum becomes of no importance at all, because it's still somebody 
else's money that they will want back.  
Indeed, the Chief Executive identifies that this gap in knowledge of finance is 
not unique to Wandland:
Chief Exec: One of the areas where there’s most often a gap is in understanding the 
financing and funding of housing associations, particularly a stock transfer 
association like this one that spends its first fourteen years in deficit. 
However, observation of the training session demonstrated an understanding 
of financial issues despite these various denials of expertise. For example, 
Tenant 2 first of all attempts to deny expertise: ‘I can understand it, and if I 
can understand then anyone can’, and later she thanked the trainer for his 
explanations, repeating that she thought she would not understand. However, 
in an earlier discussion on refinancing by HAs she commented, ‘a lot of 
people do refinance’.  At another point, in response to the trainer's anecdote 
about advice he gave to his niece concerning her business, where he 
comments that the fact that she had spent a lot of money on buying and doing 
up her house might not be considered a problem because it would add value 
to the house, Tenant 2 responds 'almost collateral’. Clearly she is able to use 
the jargon of financial expertise.79
The training session on finance also demonstrated the way in which different 
board members responded to lack of expertise. So whilst the tenant board 
members openly express their in-expertise, the independent members adopt 
a different approach: they are not openly willing to express a lack of 
knowledge. So Independent 1 appeared to have had discussions with the 
trainer prior to the session, and so enabled him/her to establish a certain  
expertise within the training sessions:
Trainer 1: [introductory remarks] had a previous discussion with Ind1 about what we 
mean by financial accruals.
Independent 2 also demonstrated some understanding of financial language:
Trainer1:  [discussing the definition of operating surplus] its what’s left from turnover 
after deducted operating costs but not interest payments
Independent 2:  is it like gross margin?
Discussion of finance at this training session also prompted Councillor 2 to 
raise questions about the identity of Wandland HA. When discussing the 
meaning of ‘operating surplus’ the trainer referred to 'trading income', which 
provoked the following Councillor 2 to comment: 'You worried me slightly. We 
are not allowed to use the word profit, but another word you talked about was 
trading.’
Private finance and funders
Indeed, it was in this area of the role of the association as a business, and the 
implications of having to raise large amounts of private finance, that the lack 
of a particular sort of understanding of financial matters was perhaps most 
apparent. At the last board meeting we observed, the board was being asked 
to decide who should attend the interviews that had been set up with a range 
of private funders to decide who the association should seek funding from. 
There was a need for the board to be able to demonstrate to potential 
financiers that the board did have financial expertise, and the concern that 
their lack of expertise might negatively impact on the association in the 
financial market-place. The CML interviewee said that finance was a 'key' skill 
they would look for in boards. The private funders we interviewed said that 
they looked at the CVs of board members when considering what sort of 
financial risk the association might expose them to, which was also the point 
made to the board by the consultant it employed as a funding adviser:
In the business/corporate plan they will be looking at the key headings, including CVs 
of BMs…hence why you are addressing the particular issue on the finance side.
As one board member put it, in the discussion about who should attend the 
interviews with funders, it was as much the funders interviewing them as it 
was them interviewing funders. As the following passages from the 
observation of this board meeting demonstrate, a consensus appears to 
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appropriate to face the financiers, despite the fact that they appear not to 
possess any more formal financial expertise than the other members:
Discussion moves on to who is going to interview and meet the funders. Tenant 1 and 
Tenant 2 both say they’ll do it and Independent 2 is obviously uncomfortable with this.
Independent 2: It’s really important that we get the right combination on the interview 
panel...there’s no point them turning up and not having the right panel...we are being 
interviewed as much as them...I’m not saying I’m the right person but...
Tenant 2: Independent 2 - can you do it then?
Independent 2: It’s really important we get the right people.
Tenant 2: Independent 2, Independent 3? Can you do that day?
Independent 2: I’m happy to throw my lot in. 
Tenant 3: [quietly but sincerely] thanks very much, that’s really appreciated.
Tenant 2: I can do it if you want...I think I should as I’m vice chair.
Independent 2 stresses the need for pre-interview meetings of BMs and funding 
advisors “we need more time, we want to impress the funders not do the opposite”
Tenant 3: It’s seems like we’re choosing the funders on the back of a fag-packet...this 
should have been an agenda item.
However, even for the independent member chosen by the board to attend 
the interviews with funders, there was a moment of embarrassment when it 
his/her lack of knowledge was exposed:
Independent 2: I haven't quite understood the process…does the board have any 
more input in the short-listing? I'd like Legal Advisor to have input re: which solicitors 
work with which banks etc. and I would prefer to go with one of the banks we've 
heard of - not Dexia - never heard of them.
Funding Advisor: Dexia are one of the biggest banks in the world…they are the 
main player in the HA sector.
Independent 2: Well that shows what I know.
Chief Exec: I've borrowed £43 million from them in the past so they're probably okay.
So, despite having shown some understanding of the financial world, 
Independent 2's 'expertise' is down-graded, s/he is made to appear lacking in 
appropriate knowledge. The question s/he asks is effectively silenced by the 
consultant chief executive's ability to delineate the field within the bounds of 
their own knowledge and experience. 
However, despite this focus on financial expertise, the CML interviewee noted 
that 'there’d be very few associations that have come under difficulties 
through financial problems.  By and large the difficulties arise through 
governance.'  81
The role of consultants
There is another point about expertise in the world of private funding that does 
not appear at all in any of the interviews or observations, and that is the role 
of law. For it is in the legal contract between the funder and the association 
that the board will find its decisions bounded, as much as in the financial 
terms - loan rates, repayment period etc., and yet, it is the legal consultants 
whose role is rarely (if ever) called into question. 
Officer 3: they have been totally reliant in some cases, on (inaudible) advice, and 
you'll see the faces around the table all look to [legal consultant] at the same point to 
say ‘What should we be doing here?’, and he’ll respond to say ‘Here are your options, 
I recommend this one’. And I've never heard them dispute anything that has come 
from (inaudible) as far as advice, to date. Whether they will develop into that probing 
questioning group, yet to be seen. You're probably up against one of the considered 
best sort of brains in the country though, aren't you? When you're talking the 
business…
Indeed, the consultants are yet another layer of expertise present in the 
dynamics of the board. These are the consultants employed in all voluntary 
transfers, to advise the council and then, when the shadow board assumes a 
level of responsibility, to advise the board and officers employed by the 
association. These are consultants who are generally drawn from a limited 
number of consultancy firms that have made the large scale voluntary transfer 
of social housing their business. They develop, or lay claim to having 
developed, expertise in the process of transfer. They can claim to know what 
the Housing Corporation wants, and their experience provides both the board 
and the regulator with reassurance. It is a requirement of the transfer process 
that councils employ consultants. However, this claim to expertise through 
experience (as well as professionally acquired expertise - however, what is 
appropriate expertise must be a contested issue, and itself worth 
investigating) can be seen as a weakness as well as a strength, as in this 
comment from a board member at a board meeting:
Independent 1 makes an aside about the consultant ‘bragging’ about his 67 transfers: 
"It makes me wonder whether they just rubbed out the names."
And although board members generally deferred to the expertise of the 
consultants, their were signs that trust was not without question:
Independent 4: To be honest I’ve not read them verbatim, I’ve skimmed them, we 
have had to rely on consultants.
Tenant 3: I’d like to make the point that we have got this information from officers and 
consultants and that we have no way of knowing whether they’re right or not. They 
don’t mean that much to us.
Deferring to expertise
This issue about deference to, or over-reliance on, expertise is one that has 
been raised in previous research by Collier (2005). His action research on a 
housing association board suggests that, in the absence of accounting 82
expertise, board members place high levels of trust in, and defer to, those 
with financial expertise. Similar concerns were raised by the Finance Director, 
who was appointed during the period of our research from another association 
(here called Brookford).
I mean one of the issues that Brookford had, which is something that is being 
addressed here, is there was only really one person with any real financial skills. He 
became the Chair of the Society actually and he was a Chartered Accountant who 
was in practice so at least he was, he had financial skills to understand the issues 
and a lot of the board tended to rely on him in terms of looking at the relationship 
between me and him, and well as long as we were happy with, as long as he was 
happy with the advice that I was giving the board tended to go along with it, which is 
always a danger with these things. … the board did tend to look to that one individual 
and that is quite a danger.
However, the FD thought that the board of Wandland were aware of these 
dangers to some degree, so although they were looking to fill the vacant 
board member position with an accountant, this would be balanced by other 
board members with business experience (note the equating of 'financial' with 
'business' expertise):
[T]he Chair up here seems to be quite switched on and I think there are a couple of 
other people that are certainly…have been involved in business in some shape or 
form so they are financially aware.'
Second class board members?
Whilst we have argued in this paper for a broad view of expertise that 
recognizes the experience that tenants bring as valid and equivalent expertise 
to professional knowledge skills, this is not an argument that is yet won, or 
even perhaps accepted as valid. Certainly, one of our board members called 
into question the contribution of the tenant board members.
Independent 2: I don't want to be condescending about this ... I don't know whether 
... I mean the tenants from their point of view they want their new doors and um ... 
fitted this or whatever, and they want to see their house improved.  So and ... it's not 
a particularly easy process to understand.  I mean I suppose I take it for granted, I've 
been educated and I'm a lawyer and whatever, but it's taken me more than a day to 
understand what's involved and how it's worked out.  So I think the tenants probably 
don't entirely understand the process, other than they can see that they get more 
money if they transfer.  And that's probably why they voted that way.
Others have argued that to understand the contribution that of tenant board 
members could make as simply arising from their experience as tenants was 
equally problematic:
NHF: And I think we have to careful not to think that the tenant Board members are 
the ones, it comes back to the point I made earlier, the ones who are bri- who are the 
only ones who both bring and listen to, and speak about the tenant voice on there, 
because that is then I think, pigeon holing the tenant Board member, because its 
almost patronising to them, actually you're just there as the voice of the tenant, 
because they're not ah, clearly because that is the group they have come from they 
will be more aware of it.83
TPAS, the Tenant Participation and Advisory Service, provides training and 
works with tenant governors. Their Chief Executive, Phil Morgan, perceived 
that, on a national level, there was a problem for tenant board members in 
getting their contribution recognized:
Tenants are now perceiving that they are seen as second class directors by other 
governors. Other governors think that an awareness of the tenant perspective is only 
one part of being a good governor, that they need more expertise in other areas. 
Some independents feel that the expertise tenants bring might not be enough.
The response of TPAS to this is two-pronged: tenants' perspective should not 
be written off, it should be seen as part of the 'grounding' of board decision-
making; however, this should not be the only perspective that tenants bring. 
They argue that more should be done to bring tenants into the sphere of 
governing before there is a need for new tenant governors - tenants should 
have exposure to the issues of governing before having to make the decision 
as to whether they should stand for board membership, and before others 
have to judge whether they would support them as board members.
Conclusion
The role of expertise within the RSL board, we would suggest, is highly 
problematic. It can be used as a 'dividing practice': tenant governors without 
professional or business expertise become perceived as second class 
governors; and divides the executive from the board members because the 
latter do not possess the highly specialised knowledges, particularly in the 
area of private finance. Expertise de-politicises the role of the board, with 
board members assuming the role of providing a 'second opinion' to officers' 
proposals from the perspective of also being professionals - the overall world 
view of the association does not get challenged. The valorisation of expertise 
can produce over-reliance on individuals, whether they are board members 
with expertise, or consultants. And finally, as David Walker suggests, 
expertise can divide the board from the communities they are meant to 
working within:
Meanwhile, if you possess expertise, ipso facto you will be more distant from those 
who are non expert, and in the case of social housing that doesn’t mean, not just the 
tenants, but the area, the people, the community, who clearly will be made up of 
people who don’t know. Um so I think there is a fundamental, an un-thought-through 
stage in the argument once hearing from er from public bodies that on the one hand 
they do want communities to be represented in some way, but on the other they want 
community organs to be expert, and you can't have both.
Given the central position that expertise appears to hold in the new forms of 
governance that are emerging fore public services, our research suggests the 
need for a greater understanding about the interplay between lay knowledges 
and expert knowlegdes, and the ways in which both can be understood as 
playing equally valid contributions to the governing processes.8485
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The Role of Board Members in the Governance of an LSVT 
RSL
Research  Team:  Professor  David  Cowan,  Dr  Morag  McDermont,  Jessica 
Prendergrast
Introduction
The  aim  of this research  project  was to consider  the  role(s) of tenants  as 
board  members  of  Registered  Social  Landlords,  which  take  over  the 
management of part or all of a local authority’s stock through a large scale 
voluntary transfer (LSVT). At an early stage, however, our object of enquiry 
expanded to include the role of all members of the board, not just tenants.
During the research we used a variety of methods, including a literature review, interviews 
with key policy informants, board members, officers and others connected with the transfer, 
and observations of board meetings, board training sessions and working group meetings. 
Fieldwork began in July 2005, when contact was made with Wandland, and was completed in 
December 2005.
In  this  report  we  highlight  three  issues  that  became  apparent  during  the 
course of our research:
 External constraints on decision-making
 ‘Expertise’ 
 Representativeness
In addition, a number of other issues are discussed briefly:
 The workings of the board
 Barriers to effective board membership
 The role of tenant participation 
This  document  is a  summary of  our findings. For  ease  of  reference, each 
section begins by highlighting the key points made in that section.
External constraints on decision-making
In  this  part,  we  discuss  the  problems  and  frustrations  caused  by  external 
constraints on board decision-making. We draw attention to the constraints 
created (a) by regulators, especially the Housing Corporation and the Audit 
Commission; (b) the local council and the original ‘offer document’ circulated 
to tenants.86
(a) Regulators
The most frequently voiced constraint on the board’s role as decision-maker 
were the requirements of the Housing Corporation, as regulator, and the Audit 
Commission, in its inspection role. This was raised during interviews by all 
board  members.  Some  members  however  viewed  it  (more  or  less)  as  a 
necessary constraint, whilst others saw the presence of the Corporation as 
potentially making the board little more than a puppet of the state regulator. 
Perhaps more noticeable, however, was the role played by the Corporation in 
decision-making at board and working group meetings. It was not necessarily 
the presence of the Corporation officer that produced a sense of limited room 
for manoeuvre. More striking, however, was the frequency with which board 
members, and officers, would indicate that a particular course of action, or 
policy document, had to be agreed because it was a Corporation requirement,  
or  to  ‘please’  the  Housing  Corporation.  One  effect  of  this  feeling  that  the 
Corporation was always ‘sitting on the shoulder’ of the board was to curtail 
discussion on policy-making. 
(b) The Council and offer document
Less frequently raised was the constraining role of the Council in the form of 
prior decisions taken by the Council which the board must continue to follow. 
This  is  in  part  a  result  of  the  promises  made  to  tenants  in  the  ‘Offer 
Document’. For example, in deciding on the policy as to the timing of repairs 
to  empty  properties,  it  was  noted  by  a  board  member  ‘It’s  not  what  the 
Housing Corporation wants but it’s part of what we promised tenants in the 
offer document.’ Indeed this issue was played out as a conflict between the 
existence of promises to tenants and the difficulties that associations get into 
with the Corporation/Audit Commission if they do not follow the Corporation’s 
policy, with little room for strategic decision-making by the board. There were 
also points at which the board felt constrained to adopt existing Council policy, 
apparently for fear of upsetting councillors prior to transfer. However, in these 
cases it was acknowledged that the policy might be revised post-transfer, so 
the board appears to be less concerned that ‘the shadow of’ the Council will 
be a long-term constraint.
Expertise 
Our  research  considers  the  meaning  of  expertise.  Wandland’s  Board 
demonstrates  the  value  of  a  wide  range  of  expertise,  not  just  formal 
professional  skills and training.  However, there are also dangers in having 
pockets of expertise in specific areas such as finance. In such arenas, this 
can lead to non-participation in decision-making and a greater willingness to 
accept the word of a single board member. We outline areas in which there 
may be difficulties for the board in the future.87
(a) Meaning of expertise
When we talk about ‘expertise’ in the context of the RSL board we are using 
the term in a wide sense, not simply to encompass the skills and knowledge 
acquired  through  professional  training,  but  also  the  experience  that  board 
members  have  acquired  in  their  personal  and  working  lives.  The  Housing 
Corporation  and  ODPM  ‘line’  on  expertise  is  to  stress  the  importance  of 
recruiting independent board members to bring in ‘the necessary financial and 
business acumen’, and the importance of board member training programmes 
to provide the necessary skills and knowledge. 
However,  in  our  interviews  and  observations  it  became  clear  that  board 
members saw expertise as wider than simply professional and business skills:
 General expertise in governing had been gained by those who had sat 
on boards of other voluntary organisations, as school governors, or had 
been a local councillor. However, the representative from the ODPM 
thought  that  one  could  not  entirely  transfer  across  experience  as  a 
school  governor  to  an  HA  board  because  of  the  differing  financial 
position of schools compared to HAs.
 The experience of tenants both as occupiers of social housing and 
gained through tenant involvement processes, and subsequent work, 
e.g. as Tenant Inspector, Investors in People inspector, or work on the 
Tenants’ Panel. 
The board also relies heavily on the experience and expertise of others: the 
consultants,  in  their  various  guises,  are  largely  deferred  to  and  seldom 
challenged, and the policies brought forward by officers are discussed, but 
rarely significantly amended by the board (though this is also an element of 
the need to fulfil Housing Corporation regulatory requirements). 
(b) Financial expertise
An  understanding  and  experience  of  finance  was  seen  as  a  key  area  of 
expertise  by  many  interviewees.  When  asked  about  their  training 
requirements,  board members  would frequently  raise financial  expertise as 
the  first  need.  Equally,  financial  expertise  was  frequently  raised  by  board 
members as an area of weakness, even in those who have some experience 
of running businesses. However, it was evident from the interventions made 
by  board  members  at  the  training  session  on  finance  as  well as  at  board 
meetings, that there was an understanding of financial matters (for example, 
understanding  the  terminology,  and  an  ability  to  ask  financial  questions). 
Nevertheless, board members’ concern about their own financial in-expertise 
was most apparent in the discussion about funders. This was possibly made 
more acute by the knowledge that funders would be looking at the CVs of 
board  members  as  one  element  in  assessing  whether  to  provide  private 
finance (this was raised at the board meeting and confirmed in our interview 
with a major funder). 88
Evidence  suggests  that,  in  the  absence  of  accounting  expertise,  board 
members place high levels of trust in those with financial expertise, or justify 
decisions  in terms of needing to meet performance expectations. This  can 
lead other board members into a feeling that they are unable to express their 
opinions on matters that, whilst having a financial dimension, are essentially 
decisions about the strategic direction the organisation should be following.
(c) Areas of future difficulty
Some of the difficulties that might face the board in the future in regard to 
expertise were raised in various interviews:
 Some  board  members,  particularly  councillors,  were  concerned  that 
they were building up levels of expertise that would go to waste if they 
lost their seat, or if the Council (or their Group) decided to remove them 
from the board.
 Whilst tenants’ expertise as occupiers of social housing is recognised 
as an important area of expertise, one of our key policy informants said 
that some tenant governors (in other associations) perceive that they 
are seen as second class board members by other governors, and that 
some independents feel that the expertise tenants bring (an awareness 
of the tenant perspective) might not  be enough. Issues of individual 
perception  of  value  should,  therefore,  be  considered  and  discussed 
regularly.
 There  is  a danger of over-reliance  on  the perceived  experts.  It was 
noticeable  that  in  board  meetings  it  was  only  the  tenant  board 
members who voiced opinions on what were perceived as ‘consumer’ 
issues.  Thus,  the  danger  is  that  pockets  of  expertise  open  up  on 
specific issues (although this may also be turned into an advantage as 
well).
 Expertise  should  be  used  flexibly  and  not  as  a  straitjacket  for 
previously used practices. Some of those interviewed saw that there 
was a danger that expertise and knowledge of the field might override 
other considerations of what is important.
Representativeness
Our research paid particular attention to the way in which the constituency model has given 
rise to an apparent contradiction between board members acting as representatives of their 
constituency, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, as independent of that constituency, 
as neutral members of a  Board. This contradiction  may be  more  apparent  than real. Our 
interviewees  felt  that  they  could  balance  it.  However,  the  contradiction  is  emphasised  at 
different times as a result of the ‘constituency model’ and the process of election of tenants. It 
is particularly difficult for councillors, such as over the valuation of the stock and their political 
allegiance.
(a) The problem89
One of the principle areas of tension within the model of corporate governance adopted for 
LSVT associations is that board members should not play a representative role and should 
instead act independently of their nominating constituency. This is a requirement imposed by 
the  ODPM  (and  required  by  the  Housing  Corporation).  It  apparently  emanates  from  the 
private  sector  corporate  model  which  considers  that  the  primary  responsibility  of  board 
members  is  the  pursuit  of  the  ‘corporate  interest’  of  the  organisation.  The  primary 
responsibility  of  all  governors  on  an  LSVT  RSL  board  is  therefore  to  the  board  and  the 
organisation itself rather than to any particular constituency. 
Our interviews made clear that this message had been effectively taken on board by all board 
members, though some did acknowledge that it took time to comprehend this role. Board 
members tended to feel that they could manage this contradiction. The Housing Corporation 
representative said that this was one of the most difficult things that they have to get over to 
LSVT boards.
(b) Examples of the contradictions
Example 1: The constituency model, under which one third of the board members come 
from each of three ‘constituencies’ (tenants, council  and independents), is adopted by the 
Corporation partly because equality of representation is seen to demonstrate independence. 
It originates in compromise between a group of different interests. However, some key policy 
informants  suggested  that  this  model  implies  some  form  of  democratic  representation, 
participation and empowerment, and that these aims have been promoted either as policy or 
to make transfer appear more attractive to local authorities and tenants. 
Example 2: The election process suggests that the democratic and representative role for 
both tenants and councillors is reinforced by the process by which they gain membership of 
the Board. The Audit Commission have pointed out the ambiguities inherent in the model in a 
recent report. Nevertheless the ODPM, Housing Corporation and the NHF all suggest that 
some form of election process is the most appropriate to produce tenant board members. 
Somewhat  confusingly,  they  suggest  that  a  democratic  process  is  important  for  creating 
legitimacy  for  tenant  board  members  and  so  that  ‘they  are  representative  of  the  wide 
constituency of tenants’. 
The  situation  in  Wandland  equally  has  the  potential  for  confusion.  The 
Tenants’ Forum has a significant say in the criteria and selection of tenants 
who will stand for election. However, the resultant board members are then 
not allowed to represent the views of the Forum. 
(c) Councillors and the non-representative model
The  tension  in  this  non-representation  model  is  perhaps  clearest  when  viewed  from  the 
perspective of councillor board members. Indeed, for the Local Government Association key 
stakeholder, the requirement of non-representation was ‘nonsense’. 
Example 1: Valuation of the Housing Stock During the period of our research, one of the 
principle areas of tension between board and Council has been the value of the housing stock 
and therefore the capital receipt the Council would receive. From the point of view of the LGA, 
it is precisely for this sort of debate that councillors should be on the board – there are a 
number of interests at stake, and councillors have a duty to represent not just their members 
who are tenants, but the public interest in the district of Wandland. 
Example  2:  Political  Allegiance  and  Board  Membership  The  Council  board  members 
recognised that part of the reason they in particular had been nominated for the board was 
that the Council representation had to reflect the political make-up of the Council. Therefore it 
was their political allegiance, as well as their interest in housing, that led to nomination. This 90
issue has recently been highlighted when the two board members who were Conservative 
councillors resigned following the vote against the transfer in the Council meeting.
In this report we cannot offer any solutions to the ambiguities and tensions surrounding the 
non-representative  role  that  is  imposed  on  board  members  –  we  can  merely  highlight  its 
practical ramifications. We would echo the Audit Commission’s concern that this is an issue 
that the Housing Corporation needs to address as a matter of urgency. The processes which 
the board now has for elections and decision-making are standard within LSVT associations. 
However, some thought will need to be given to offering advice, particularly to new members 
of the board, about their role. 
Other issues 
The role of the board – strategists, monitors or jury?
One view of the role of the board is that it makes decisions about the strategic 
direction the organisation should take. However, research in the private sector 
suggests that the board of directors model has limited application for involving 
non-executives in strategic decision-making in private sector businesses. One 
board member interviewee had the interesting but unusual notion of governing 
bodies as juries, as a process of arbitrating between different groups coming 
forward with different ideas to the area, discussing them, and coming to a 
compromise. Others saw the role of the board as monitoring the progress of 
the association, ensuring its compliance with policies (most of which appear to 
the board as being prescribed by the Housing Corporation). 
Barriers to effective board membership
When asked what factors made it difficult for board members to carry out their 
job effectively, most cited the problem of workload – the volume of papers that 
had  to  be  read  for  meetings,  and  the  number  of  meetings  and  training 
sessions.  This  was  particularly  an  issue  for  councillors  who,  apart  from 
Council  committees,  were  frequently  members  of  other  committees.  There 
was also some discussion amongst a large proportion of interviewees about 
the  need for  a differently devised  training programme  which reflected their 
more practical needs.
The role of tenant participation
A  number  of  issues  arose  in  our  interviews  with  key  policy  informants 
concerning  the  relationship  between  tenant  board  members  and  tenant 
participation  strategies.  First,  it  was  said  that  the  former  should  not  be  a 
substitute  for  the  latter:  there  needs  to  be  “an  overall  strategy  for 
understanding  how  you  relate  to  tenants,  what  is  important  to  tenants 
themselves,  …  and  making  sure  that  structures  are  effective”.  Second,  in 
some  cases  when  local  tenant  leaders  have  become  part  of  board 
governance  structures  this  has  left  a  gap  in  local  tenants’  representative 
groups.  Third,  tenants  on  the  board  is  not  the  same  as  tenants  making 
decisions  –  it  is  only  a  small  number  of  tenants  who  become  involved  in 
decision-making  and  they  are  not  representatives.  Fourth,  mechanisms 
should be in place to ensure that new tenants are able to take up places on 
the board when existing members retire/leave. 91
APPENDIX B: 
Interview Questionnaire for use with 
Key Actors
1. Is the current basis of LSVT RSL governance important? 
(by ‘current basis’ we mean the make-up of the board from one-third 
tenants, one-third LA representatives and one-third independents)
Is it important for tenants?
Is it important for councillors?
Is it important for independent members?
How does it fit in with other current initiatives – e.g. active 
communities?
Has your organisation’s position on these points changed over time? If 
so, why? (e.g. the initial LSVTs did not have this board set up – any 
views on this?)
2. Why is this form of governance important generally, and for each of the 
groups?
3. How would you characterise the kinds of expertise each group brings 
with them
4. Does the current basis of LSVT RSL governance work satisfactorily? 
Why should/does it apply just to LSVTs?92
APPENDIX C: 
Interview Questionnaire for use with 
Wandland HA
TOPIC GUIDE
FOR USE WITH COUNCILLORS, TENANTS, INDEPENDENTS




housing history – tenure (ie have you always been in social 
housing/tenant/owner),
local?, 
how were you appointed? – were you happy with the way you were 
appointed? How should you have been appointed? How should the other 
groups be appointed?
Should you be here?
Tenants panel/forum
2. what is the role of a/the governing body
a. What is your role individually? 
b. What is your role as independent, councillor, tenant? 
c. What are the roles of the others – prompt: separate/distinct?
d. What do other groupings bring to the board?
3. what are the qualities required of a board member? 
Prompt: decision-maker/strategist/consumer/representative/expert
4. how did the training facilitate your role? Did you find the training 
useful?
5. What are the difficulties you find in performing your role? What 
difficulties do you anticipate emerging in the future? Prompt: difficulties 
experienced by others
6. what is the role of the council officers? What is the role of the housing 
association officers? Do the officers assist you in performing your role? 
Will they?93
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